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Dynamic spectrum access is a new paradigm of secondary spectrum utilization and sharing. It allows unli-
censed secondary users (SUs) to exploit opportunistically the under-utilized licensed spectrum. Market mech-
anism is a widely-used promising means to regulate the consuming behaviours of users and, hence, achieve
the efficient allocation and consumption of limited resources. In this paper, we propose and study a hybrid
secondary spectrum market consisting of both the futures market and the spot market, in which SUs (buyers)
purchase under-utilized licensed spectrum from a spectrum regulator, either through predefined contracts
via the futures market, or through spot transactions via the spot market. We focus on the optimal spectrum
allocation among SUs in an exogenous hybrid market that maximizes the secondary spectrum utilization
efficiency. The problem is challenging due to the stochasticity and asymmetry of network information. To
solve this problem, we first derive an off-line optimal allocation policy that maximizes the ex-ante expected
spectrum utilization efficiency based on the stochastic distribution of network information. We then propose
an on-line VickreyCClarkeCGroves (VCG) auction that determines the real-time allocation and pricing of
every spectrum based on the realized network information and the pre-derived off-line policy. We further
show that with the spatial frequency reuse, the proposed VCG auction is NP-hard; hence, it is not suitable
for on-line implementation, especially in a large-scale market. To this end, we propose a heuristics approach
based on an on-line VCG-like mechanism with polynomial-time complexity, and further characterize the cor-
responding performance loss bound analytically. We finally provide extensive numerical results to evaluate
the performance of the proposed solutions.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Background and Motivations
Radio electromagnetic spectrum is a limited resource for wireless communications, and is becom-
ing more congested and scarce with the explosive development of wireless services and networks.
Nonetheless, extensive studies (e.g., FCC (2002), McHenry et al. (2006)) have shown that many
spectrum bands are heavily under-utilized due to the significant variations in spectrum occupying
time and space. This suggests that the traditional static licensing approach, i.e., granting exclusive
spectrum usage right to a single commercial or government department over a long time and in a
large area, is no longer efficient or suitable for future wireless networks. Dynamic spectrum access
(DSA) has been recently recognized as a novel and promising approach to increase spectrum uti-
lization efficiency and alleviate spectrum scarcity. The key idea is to enable unlicensed secondary
users (SUs) to exploit the under-utilized licensed spectrum in an opportunistic manner (see Haykin
(2005), Akyildiz et al. (2006), Buddhikot (2007), Zhao & Sadler (2007)).1 The long-term success
of DSA requires many innovations in technology, economics, and policy. In particular, it is essen-
tial to design a secondary spectrum sharing mechanism that achieves a high secondary spectrum
utilization efficiency, and meanwhile offers necessary incentives for licensees to open their licensed
spectrum for secondary sharing and unlicensed access.2
Market mechanism is a widely-used promising means to regulate and coordinate the consuming
behaviours of users and, hence, achieve the efficient allocation and consumption of limited resource.
Therefore, market-driven secondary spectrum trading is a natural choice to achieve the efficient
spectrum utilization, and also a promising approach to address the incentive issue (see Hossain
et al. (2009), Tonmukayakul & Weiss (2009)). With secondary spectrum trading, SUs temporarily
purchase the under-utilized licensed spectrum from a spectrum regulator (SR), such as an agent
representing the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the United States or Ofcom in
the United Kingdom.3 The secondary spectrum market differs from conventional markets (e.g.,
paintings, bonds, and electricity markets) in the following two aspects. First, radio spectrum is
spatially reusable. That is, a spectrum can be potentially used by multiple SUs simultaneously,
as long as these SUs do not generate mutual interferences (see Section 3.4 for details). Second,
the availability of spectrum is not deterministic. To protect the subscribed primary users (PUs)
benefits, a spectrum is only available to SUs when it is not occupied by any PU (i.e., when it is
idle). Due to the stochastic nature of PUs’ activities, the spectrum availability is often a random
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Figure 1 Illustration of a time-slotted secondary spectrum market. The SUs not connected by an edge are
interference-free, and can use the same (idle) spectrum at the same time without mutual interference.
For example, the idle (green) spectrum at time t= 7 is allocated to SUs {2, 6, 8} simultaneously.
variable (see Section 3.1 for details). Based on the above two facts, the mechanism design in such a
secondary spectrum market needs to overcome a different set of challenges than in a conventional
market.
1.2. Market Model and Problem Formulation
In this paper, we consider the secondary spectrum trading between one SR (seller) and multiple
SUs (buyers) for all idle spectrum in a given time period which consists of multiple time slots.4
Moreover, we consider the short-term spectrum trading, i.e., the idle spectrum is traded on a slot-
by-slot basis. Figure 1 illustrates such a time-slotted secondary spectrum market within a period
of 12 time slots. The blank and shadowed squares denote the idle spectrum and busy spectrum
in each time slot, respectively. The edge connecting two SUs denotes the interference relationship
between them. In other words, any two SUs without a connecting edge (e.g., SUs {4, 5} or SUs
{6, 8}) are interference-free (also called independent), and thus can use the same (idle) spectrum
concurrently without any mutual interference. In this example, the idle spectrum at time t= 7 is
allocated to SUs {2, 6, 8} simultaneously, as these SUs are independent of each other.
More specifically, we consider a hybrid secondary spectrum market consisting of both the futures
market and the spot market. In such a market, SUs can purchase spectrum either through predefined
futures contracts via the futures market, or through spot transactions via the spot market. In the
futures market, each SU reaches an agreement, called a futures contract or guaranteed contract,
directly with the SR. The contract specifies not only the SU’s total demand and payment in the
given period, but also the SR’s penalty if violating the contract.5 In the spot market, SUs buy
spectrum in a real-time and on-demand manner through spot transactions, and multiple SUs may
compete with each other for limited spectrum resource (e.g., through an auction). In the example of
Fig. 1, we denote the contract users (blue) by 1, 2, 3, and 4, each requesting a pre-specific number
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of spectrum. Likewise, we denote the spot market users (red) by 5, 6, 7, and 8, each requesting and
competing for spectrum in an on-demand manner. It is easy to see that the futures market insures
buyers (sellers) against uncertainties of future supply (demand) through predefined contracts, while
the spot market allows buyers to compete for limited resource based on their real-time demands
and preferences.6 Therefore, such a hybrid market has both the reliability of the futures market
and the flexibility of the spot market; hence, it is highly desirable for Quality of Service (QoS)
differentiations in secondary spectrum utilization. Specifically, an SU with elastic traffic (e.g., file
transferring or FTP downloading) may be more interested in spot transactions to achieve a flexible
resource-price tradeoff; whereas, an SU with inelastic traffic requiring specific data rates (e.g.,
Netflix video streaming or VoIP) may prefer the certainty of contracts in the futures market.
We consider a quasi-static market scenario, where both the network topology and the hybrid
market structure are exogenously given and fixed in each time period, but may change across
different time periods.7 In particular, we focus on the optimal spectrum allocation in a particular
time period with a particular exogenous and fixed hybrid market, i.e., with given contract users
(in the futures market) and given spot transaction users (in the spot market).8 Namely, we want
to answer the following question: how to optimally allocate spectrum among the given contract
users and spot market users to maximize the secondary spectrum utilization efficiency in that
time period. Here, the secondary spectrum utilization efficiency (also called spectrum efficiency) is
defined as the total social welfare generated by all SUs from utilizing idle spectrum in the whole
time period (see Section 3.5 for the detailed definition).
This problem is challenging due to the stochasticity and asymmetry of network information.
Here, network information mainly refers to the benefit (utility) of each SU from using each (idle)
spectrum in each time slot. Stochasticity means that no one can observe the network information
in the future, as the network changes randomly over time. Asymmetry means that the currently
realized information of an SU is the private information, and cannot be observed by other entities,
such as the SR and other SUs. Nevertheless, in the hybrid spectrum market, the allocation of
spectrum in the whole time period must be jointly optimized due to the time-coupling constraint
on the contract user demand (e.g., each contract user requires a specific number of spectrum in
the whole period). This implies that solving the optimal spectrum allocation problem directly
would require the complete network information in all time slots. As mentioned above, however,
in practice the SR only has partial knowledge (e.g., the stochastic distribution) about the future
network information because of the stochasticity of information. Moreover, it cannot observe all
of the realized current network information, especially the private information of SUs, due to the
asymmetry of information. Therefore, the key research problem becomes the following:
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Table 1 Key results in this paper
Problem Solution Performance Complexity Section No.
E-SEM: Expected Spectrum Policy + VCG Optimal Exponential 5, 6
Efficiency Maximization Policy + VCG-like Sub-optimal Polynomial 5, 6, 7
Problem 1. How should the SR optimally allocate the idle spectrum in the given period among
the contract users and spot market users to maximize the spectrum efficiency, taking into consid-
eration the spatial spectrum reuse, information stochasticity, and information asymmetry?
1.3. Solutions and Contributions
To solve this problem, we first derive an off-line optimal policy that maximizes the ex-ante expected
spectrum efficiency based on the stochastic distribution of network information. We then design
an on-line VickreyCClarkeCGroves (VCG) auction that elicits SUs’ private information realized
in every time slot. Based on the elicited network information and the derived off-line policy, the
VCG auction determines the real-time allocation and pricing of every spectrum. Such a solution
technique (i.e., off-line policy and on-line auction) allows us to optimally allocate every spectrum
in an on-line manner under stochastic and asymmetric information. We further show that with
the spatial spectrum reuse, the proposed VCG auction relies on solving the maximum weight
independent set (MWIS) problem, which is well-known to be NP-hard. Thus, it is not suitable for
on-line implementation, especially in a large-scale market. This motivates us to further study low-
complexity sub-optimal solutions. To this end, we propose a heuristics approach based on an on-line
VCG-like mechanism with polynomial-time complexity, and further characterize the corresponding
performance loss bound analytically. Our numerical results indicate that the heuristics approach
exhibits good and robust performance (e.g., reaches at least 70% of the optimal efficiency in our
simulations).
In summary, we list the key results and the corresponding section numbers in Table 1. It is
important to note that the main contribution of this work is not the development of new auction
theory, but rather the formulation of the hybrid spectrum market and the solution techniques
(including the use of auction theory) to optimize the spectrum utilization in a given hybrid market.
Specifically, the main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• New modeling and solution technique: We propose and study a hybrid spectrum market, which
has both the reliability of futures market and the flexibility of spot market. Hence, it is highly
desirable for QoS differentiations in secondary spectrum utilization. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first paper to study such a hybrid spectrum market with spatial spectrum reuse.
• Optimal solution under stochastic and asymmetric information: We analyze the optimal spec-
trum allocation in an exogenous hybrid market (in a particular time period) under stochastic and
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asymmetric information systematically. Our proposed solution consists of two parts: (i) an off-line
allocation policy that maximizes the ex-ante expected spectrum efficiency based on the stochastic
network information; and (ii) an on-line VCG auction that determines the real-time allocation of
every (idle) spectrum based on the realized network information and the pre-derived policy. Such
a solution technique allows us to optimally allocate every spectrum in an on-line manner.
• Heuristic solution with polynomial-time complexity : We propose a heuristic approach based
on an on-line VCG-like mechanism with polynomial-time complexity, and further characterize the
corresponding performance loss bound analytically. This polynomial-time solution is particularly
useful for achieving the efficient spectrum utilization in a large-scale network.
• Performance evaluation: We provide extensive numerical results to evaluate the performance
of the proposed solutions. Our numerical results show that: (i) the proposed optimal allocation
significantly outperforms the traditional greedy allocations, e.g., with an average increase of 20% in
terms of the expected spectrum efficiency; and (ii) the proposed heuristics approach exhibits good
and robust performance, e.g., reaching at least 70% of the optimal efficiency in our simulations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After reviewing the literature in Section 2, we
describe the system model in Section 3, and present the problem formulation in Section 4. Then we
derive the off-line optimal policy in Section 5, and design the on-line VCG mechanisms in Section
6. In Section 7, we analyze the performance loss in the low-complexity heuristic solution. in Section
8, we provide the detailed simulation results. We finally conclude in Section 9.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Secondary Spectrum Trading for DSA
A major motivation of this work is to establish economic incentives and improve spectrum uti-
lization efficiency in dynamic spectrum access (DSA) and cognitive radio networks (CRNs). There
are several comprehensive surveys on the technical aspects of DSA and CRNs (see Haykin (2005),
Akyildiz et al. (2006), Buddhikot (2007), Zhao & Sadler (2007)).
2.1.1. Secondary Spectrum Trading in Pure Spectrum Markets. Recent years have
witnessed a growing body of literature on the economic analysis (in particular the incentive issues)
of DSA (see, e.g., Hossain et al. (2009), Tonmukayakul & Weiss (2009)). Market-driven secondary
spectrum trading is a promising paradigm to address the incentive issue and achieve high spectrum
efficiency in DSA. The literature on secondary spectrum trading often considers pricing, contract,
and auction. Pricing and Contract are generally adopted by the futures market, wherein sellers
and buyers enter into certain agreements, specifying the price, quality and demand in advance. In
particular, Pricing is often used under information symmetry, where sellers and buyers possess the
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same market information (e.g., utility and quality) or hold the same degree of uncertainty about the
market information (see, e.g., Kloeck et al. (2005), Wang et al. (2008), Niyato & Hossain (2008)).
Contract has been widely used in supply chain models, with a main focus on the supply chain
coordination (see de Kok & Graves (2003) for a comprehensive survey). Contract is effective in a
market under information asymmetry, where sellers and buyers possess different information. The
seller (or buyer) can offer a selling (purchasing) contract to extract the buyer surplus (seller surplus)
as much as possible (see, e.g., Gao et al. (2010), Duan et al. (2011), Kalathil & Jain (2010)). In
contrast to Pricing and Contracts, Auctions are one of the most common mechanisms used by the
spot market, wherein buyers compete to obtain commodities by offering different bids. Auctions
are particularly suitable for the information asymmetry scenario. With a well-designed auction,
buyers (bidders) have the incentive to bid for the resource in a truthful manner, and the seller can
allocate the resource efficiently without knowing the buyers’ private information in advance (see,
e.g., Huang et al. (2006), Li et al. (2008), Gandhi et al. (2007), Wang et al. (2010), Zhou et al.
(2008), Zhou & Zheng (2009)). However, the above work considers the secondary spectrum trading
in a pure spectrum market (i.e., either spot or futures market). Instead, our setup incorporates the
short-term secondary spectrum trading in a hybrid spectrum market.
2.1.2. Secondary Spectrum Trading in Hybrid Spectrum Markets Kasbekar et al.
(2010) and Muthusamy et al. (2011) considered the secondary spectrum trading in a hybrid market.
In their settings, primary sellers offer two types of contracts: the guaranteed-bandwidth contract
and the opportunistic-access contract. The main difference between these two prior papers and
our paper lies in the formulation of the guaranteed contract. Specifically, in Kasbekar et al. (2010)
and Muthusamy et al. (2011), the guaranteed-bandwidth contract provides guaranteed access to
a certain amount of bandwidth at every time slot. In our model, the guaranteed-delivery contract
provides guaranteed access to a total amount of bandwidth in one time period; nevertheless, the
bandwidth delivery at every time slot can be different, depending on the PUs’ own demand. The
main advantage of our approach is its flexibility in shifting secondary demand across time slots
(to comply with the PUs’ random demand). That is, it enables opportunistic delivery of a small
(or large) bandwidth to SUs in those time slots that the PUs’ own demand is high (or low).
Additionally, our model is also more practically relevant to a wide range of applications, which
do not require fixed data delivery per time slot, but demand a guaranteed average data rate over
each time period. Furthermore, the underlying market models are also different. Kasbekar et al.
(2010) and Muthusamy et al. (2011) assumed that the demand (supply) markets have infinite
liquidity. That is, any bandwidth amount supplied by the seller can be sold out (any bandwidth
amount demanded by the buyer can be bought from the market) at an “outside fixed price”. In
Gao, Shou, Chen, and Huang: A Hybrid Market Approach to Dynamic Spectrum Access
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Table 2 A summary of secondary spectrum trading literature
Market Type Related Work
Futures Market
Pricing: Kloeck et al. (2005), Wang et al. (2008), Niyato & Hossain (2008).
Contract: Gao et al. (2010), Duan et al. (2011), Kalathil & Jain (2010).
Spot Market
Auction: Huang et al. (2006), Gandhi et al. (2007), Li et al. (2008), Wang et al. (2010),
Zhou et al. (2008), Zhou & Zheng (2009).
Hybrid Market Kasbekar et al. (2010), Abhishek et al. (2012), Muthusamy et al. (2011), Gao et al. (2012a)
this sense, their market models are closely related to the ideal competitive market. We assume
that the market price is endogenously determined by the associated seller and buyer (through, for
example, an VCG mechanism). Thus, we essentially consider the monopoly market.
Abhishek et al. (2012) also considered a hybrid market, in which a cloud service provider sells its
service to users via two different pricing schemes: pay-as-you-go (PAYG) and spot pricing. Under
the PAYG, users are charged a fixed price per unit time. Under the spot pricing, users compete
for services via using an auction. They focused on the optimal market formulation, that is, the
service provider selects different PAYG prices such that different users will choose different pricing
schemes or market types; consequently, different hybrid markets will be formulated. In our work,
we focused on the optimal spectrum allocation in a given hybrid market. In other words, each SU
is associated and fixed in a particular market (based on his or her application type), and the SR
determines the optimal spectrum allocation among the given contract users and spot market users.
In Gao et al. (2012a), we studied the secondary spectrum trading in the same hybrid market.
However, Gao et al. (2012a) did not consider spatial spectrum reuse, which is the key contribu-
tion of this paper. With spatial spectrum reuse, the same spectrum can be potentially used by
multiple SUs simultaneously; thus, the total spectrum efficiency can be greatly improved. This
new coupling in the spatial dimension creates many challenges (e.g., solving MWIS problems) in
the optimal mechanism design, and makes the problem significantly different from those without
spatial spectrum reuse. Precise mathematical modeling and understanding of the spatial coupling
are often lacking in the wireless literature. One of the main contributions of this paper is to propose
a low-complexity heuristic algorithm to tackle this issue, and to quantify the performance bound
of the proposed algorithm. For convenience, we summarize the key literature in Table 2.
2.2. Dual Sourcing in Supply Chain Management
The theoretic model used in our work is related to the dual sourcing problem in supply chain
management. Specifically, with dual sourcing, a firm can procure a single commodity from a sup-
plier via a long-term contract and/or from a spot market via short-term purchases (see Kleindorfer
& Wu (2003)). In such a context, the long-term contract and short-term purchase in the supply
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chain model corresponds to the guaranteed contract and spot transaction in our model, respec-
tively. Note that the firm in the supply chain model buys commodities through dual sourcing,
while the SR in our model sells commodities through guaranteed contracts and spot transactions.
The long-term/guaranteed contract ensures consistency over time availability of commodities with
guaranteed quality at a predetermined price; whereas, the short-term purchase/spot transaction
provides high inventory flexibility, allowing firms to buy and sell commodities at any quantity with
zero lead time, but at a random market price. The main advantage of dual sourcing is to hedge
the future uncertainties in the supplier’s commodity supply and the end users’ demand, so as to
hedgy the financial risk in the supply chain (see Kleindorfer (2008, 2010)).
The integration of long-term contracts and short-term purchases is of particular interest to
the firm in a supply chain, due to the following two reasons: (i) sourcing competition can keep
purchasing prices under control by the firm; and (ii) a wider supply base can mitigate the risk
induced by the uncertainty at one supplier. Lee & Whang (2002) were the first to integrate,
after sales, the spot market considerations within a newsvendor ordering framework. Peleg et al.
(2002) studied the long-term and short-term integrated sourcing using a stylized two period model.
Yi & Scheller-Wolf (2003) studied the nature of the optimal inventory policy when such a dual
sourcing is used, in the presence of a fixed cost for the spot market participation. Wu & Kleindorfer
(2005) proposed a general framework with integrated long-term and short-term contract decisions
for non-storable commodities. Kouvelis et al. (2013) studied the problem of dual sourcing with
financial hedging for storable commodities.
Our work differs from the above work in the following aspects. First, the spectrum in our model
can be potentially used by multiple SUs simultaneously, while a traditional commodity can usually
be used by one user only. Second, the availability of spectrum is stochastic, while the availability
of a traditional commodity is usually deterministic. Third, we focus on the spectrum utilization
efficiency maximization, rather than the financial risk hedging. Fourth, instead of designing the
optimal contracts, we treat contracts as exogenously given, and focus on the problem of how to
fulfill these contracts and cope with additional demand from spot markets. Finally, we consider
stochastic and asymmetric network information.
3. System Model
3.1. System Description
We consider a DSA system with one SR and multiple SUs. The SR has certain licensed frequency
band, which is divided into K orthogonal channels using channelization methods such as frequency
division and code division. In Fig. 1, for example, we have K = 3. The frequency band is licensed
to a set of subscribed users (here we call primary users, PUs), who access channels with the
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slotted transmission protocol which is widely-used in today’s wireless communication systems (e.g.,
GSM, WCDMA, and LTE). That is, the total time is divided into fixed-time intervals, called time
slots, and each PU transmits over one or multiple channel(s) according to a synchronous time slot
structure. Depending on the activities of PUs, some channels may be not used by any PU (i.e.,
idle) in some time slots, which can be potentially assigned for the secondary utilization of SUs.
We consider the market-driven dynamic spectrum access, also called secondary spectrum trading,
in which SUs temporarily purchase the idle channels from the SR. More specifically, we consider
the short-term secondary spectrum trading, in which the idle channel is traded on a slot-by-slot
basis. Namely, the basic resource unit for trading is “a particular channel at a particular time
slot”, referred to as a spectrum opportunity or spectrum. The main motivation for considering
the short-term spectrum trading is as follows. The spectrum availability changes frequently and
randomly over time due to the stochasticity of PUs’ activities; thus, a channel that is idle in a
particular time slot may not always be idle in the future.
Let chkt denote the spectrum on the k-th channel at time slot t. Let ξkt ∈ {0,1} denote the
state (availability) of spectrum chkt, with ξkt = 1 indicating that the spectrum is not used by any
PU and thus is available for SUs, and ξkt = 0 otherwise. We consider the operations in a given
period of T time slots. The total amount of spectrums in the period is referred to as the SR’s
spectrum supply, denoted by Q, {chkt}k∈{1,...,K},t∈{1,...,T}. The size of total supply is denoted by
S = |Q| , K · T . The states of all spectrums in Q are referred to as the spectrum availability,
denoted by X , {ξkt}k∈{1,...,K},t∈{1,...,T}.
Due to the uncertainty of PUs’ activities, the spectrum availability changes randomly across
both time and frequency. Fig. 1 illustrates an example of such a system, where K = 3, T = 12, and
S = 36. At the time slot t= 1, the spectrum ch21 is idle, while the spectrum ch11 and ch31 are
busy, i.e., ξ21 = 1 and ξ11 = ξ31 = 0. Note that in practical wireless communication systems, T is
usually very large. This is mainly due to two reasons. First, the length of each time slot in a wireless
system is often quite small, e.g., in milliseconds or even in microseconds, which corresponds to the
typical length of frame in many wireless communication systems (such as 4G LTE and Wi-Fi). In
fact, the physical limit of choosing the time sloth length is the so called coherence time, which is
the time within which the channel condition does not change. In wireless communications, such
coherence time is usually very small due to fast small scale multi-path fading. Second, the time
scale of each time period is relatively large, e.g., in minutes or even hours, which corresponds to
the validity period of contracts (to be defined in Section 3.3). Hence, the number of slots in each
time period (i.e., T ) is very large, e.g., T = 6 · 105 when the length of slot is 1 millisecond and the
length of period is 10 minutes.
Following are our assumptions on the spectrum availability and spectrum usage.
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Assumption 1. The spectrum availability is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
across time and frequency.9 Moreover, the spectrum availability is ergodic.
Assumption 2. Each SU can transmit over multiple channels simultaneously.10
For convenience, we denote the availability of spectrum as a random variable ξ ∈ {0,1}, and the
probability mass function of ξ as fξ(·).11 Suppose ρ is the idle probability of spectrum chkt. Then,
fξ(ξkt) = ρ if ξkt = 1, and fξ(ξkt) = 1− ρ if ξkt = 0.
3.2. Futures Market and Spot Market
Wireless applications can be broadly categorized as either elastic or inelastic depending on Quality-
of-Service (QoS) requirements.12 With elastic traffic, SUs have elastic demands for spectrum, in the
sense that the tasks are not urgent in terms of time; thus, the QoS will not be significantly affected,
even if the spectrum resource is limited and the transmission rate is low for a substantial amount of
time. With inelastic traffic, SUs have inelastic demands for spectrum. In other words, the tasks can
only function well when the data rate is guaranteed to be above certain thresholds such that the
delay requirements are met; otherwise they will suffer significant performance loss. It is important to
note that the information of the application type is usually explicitly represented in the headers of
data packets, and can be easily extracted by the network operator through deep packet inspection.
Hence, it is reasonable to assume that an SU cannot fake his or her application type arbitrarily.
Examples of elastic traffic include FTP downloading, data backup, and cloud synchronization, and
examples of inelastic traffic include VoIP, video streaming, and real-time data collection.
To accommodate the various requirements of elastic traffic and inelastic traffic (so as to achieve
desirable QoS differentiations), we propose a hybrid spectrum market combining both the futures
market and the spot market. Next we define the futures market and spot market formally.
Futures Market. In the futures market, each SU enters into an agreement, called a futures contract
or guaranteed contract, directly with the SR. The contract specifies the key elements in trading,
e.g., the SU’s total demand and payment in the given period. Once the SR accepts a contract, it
is committed to deliver the specified number of spectrum to the SU. If the SR fails to do so, it
needs to pay certain penalty for compensating the SU’s potential welfare loss. This penalty can be
a unit price paid for every undelivered spectrum (called a soft contract) or simply a total payment
for the violation of contract (called a hard contract).
Spot Market. In the spot market, each SU purchases spectrums in a real-time and on-demand
manner through spot transactions. That is, an SU initiates a purchasing request only when he or
she needs spectrum, and multiple SUs requesting the same spectrum would compete with each
other for the spectrum, e.g., through an auction. The spectrum is delivered immediately to the
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winner at a real-time market price, which depends on both the SUs’ preferences and competitions.
The winner’s payment is also dependent on the SUs’ preferences and competitions.
Although, in practice, it is more desirable to allow SUs to have the flexibility to choose which
market to join, in this work we assume that the SUs with inelastic traffic always choose the futures
market, and the SUs with elastic traffic always choose the spot market.13 In other words, we
will leave out the SU’s market selection problem, and instead focus exclusively on the spectrum
allocation in the given hybrid markets in each time period. This setup helps us to concentrate
on the technical challenges brought by spatial spectrum reuse and information stochasticity &
asymmetry.
Next we provide the key assumptions on the hybrid market structure.
Assumption 3. We assume a quasi-static market scenario, where the hybrid spectrum market is
exogenously given and fixed in each time period, but may change across different time periods.14
Assumption 4. We assume that each SU has one application, and all SUs with inelastic traffic
(elastic traffic) are in the futures market (spot market).15
Based on these assumptions, we can divide SUs into two disjoint sets, each associated with one
market. LetN , {1,2, ...,N} andM, {1,2, ...,M} denote the sets of SUs in the futures market and
the spot market, respectively. For convenience, we will use the notation “n” to denote a contract
user, and “m” to denote a spot market user. When needed, we will use the superscripts “c” and
“s” to indicate variables related to the futures market and spot market, respectively.
For analytical convenience, we further assume that the size of futures market is much smaller
than that of the spot market, i.e., N M. This assumption is used to facilitate the computation
of independent contract user sets in the later analysis.16
3.3. Futures Contract Definition
A contract could be quite complicated, depending on specific requirements of a contract user’s
application. In this work, we focus on a basic contract form, which consists of two parts: (i) the SU’s
demand and payment for spectrum in each period; and (ii) the SR’s penalty when not delivering
the demanded spectrums to the SU. Formally, we write the contract of an SU n∈N as:
Ctrn ,
{
Bn,Dn,Jn
}
, (1)
where Bn is the SU’s payment, Dn is the SU’s demand in one period, and Jn = (Jn,{P̂n, B̂n}) is
the SR’s penalty scheme. Here, Jn ∈ {0,1} indicates the contract type (soft or hard), P̂n is the unit
penalty for a soft contract (Jn = 0), and B̂n is the total penalty for a hard contract (Jn = 1). Thus,
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the actual payment of contract user n (denoted by Rn) depends on the number of spectrums he or
she actually obtains (denoted by dn), that is:
Rn =Bn−P(dn,Dn), (2)
where P(dn,Dn) is the SR’s penalty if violating the contract, given by:
P(dn,Dn),
 [Dn− dn]
+ · P̂n, Jn = 0
1(Dn− dn) · B̂n, Jn = 1
(3)
where [x]+ = max{0, x} and 1(x) = max{0, x|x|}. That is, [x]+ = 1(x) = 0 if x≤ 0, and [x]+ = x and
1(x) = 1 if x > 0. For convenience, we denote the set of all contracts in the futures market by
B , {Ctrn}n∈N . As each contract user is guaranteed to obtain the desired number of spectrum
(otherwise he can get the SR’s penalty as compensation), we refer to such a contract as the
guaranteed-delivery contract.
The important assumptions on the guaranteed contract are listed below.
Assumption 5. We assume that contract users care about the expected number of spectrums they
obtain (hence the SR’s penalty is based on the expected number of allocated spectrums).
The main practical motivation for such an assumption is that most wireless applications in
practice require an expected/average data rate during a certain time period. For example, video
streaming concerns the average downloading rate in every minute, and VoIP concerns the average
downloading/uploading rate in every second. When the actual data rate is occasionally less than
the average rate, various coding and error concealment technologies can be employed, so that the
SUs will not feel significant performance degradation. Thus, with a proper choice of the length of
allocation period (e.g., one minute for video streaming or one second for VoIP), such a contract
with the expected demand is suitable for most wireless applications. In fact, with the uncertain-
ties of spectrum availability and the stochasticity of SU utility on each spectrum, it is practically
impossible to guarantee a strict spectrum supply for each contract user. To the best of our knowl-
edge, no such guarantee has been provided even in the latest communication standard. To make
our analysis more complete, we also provide detailed theoretical analysis and numerical evaluation
for the impact of this assumption on the performance in Gao et al. (2012b).
3.4. Spatial Spectrum Reuse
As mentioned previously, an important characteristic of a spectrum market is that radio spectrum
is spatially reusable subject to certain spatial interference constraints (see Tse & Viswanath (2005)).
For example, a spectrum can be used by multiple SUs simultaneously if they are far enough apart
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Figure 2 Conflict graph representation.
and do not interfere with each other. This leads to a fundamental difference between the spectrum
market and conventional markets: the same spectrum can be potentially sold to multiple SUs.
In this work, we adopt a widely-used physical model to capture the interference relationships
between SUs, namely, the protocol interference model (see Gupta & Kumar (2000)). Under the pro-
tocol interference model, multiple SUs can use the same spectrum simultaneously without mutual
interference, if and only if none of the SUs falls inside the interference ranges of others (e.g., they
are sufficiently far away from each other). The network under a protocol interference model can
usually be represented by a conflict graph, with each vertex denoting an SU, and each edge indicat-
ing that two associated SUs fall inside the interference range of each other. Thus, any two SUs not
connected by an edge (also called independent users) can use the same spectrum simultaneously,
while any two connecting SUs cannot.
Fig. 2 illustrates the conflict graph representation for a network with 6 SUs, in which each
dash circle denotes the interference range of the associated SU. In this example, SUs 1 and 3 are
independent of each other (and therefore can use the same spectrum simultaneously), while SUs 1
and 2 are not. Fig. 1 also illustrates a similar conflict graph, where SUs 2, 6, and 8 are independent
of each other, whereas SUs 1, 2, and 3 are not.
Let G, (V,E) denote the graph consisting of all SUs (and the associated edges, similarly here-
after), where V ,M⋃N is the set of vertices (SUs), and E , {eij | i, j ∈ V} is the set of edges. Let
Gs , (Vs,E s) denote the spot market subgraph consisting of all spot market users, and Gc , (Vc,Ec)
denote the futures market subgraph consisting of all contract users, that is, Vs ,M, Vc , N ,
E s , {eij ∈ E | i, j ∈M}, and Ec , {eij ∈ E | i, j ∈ N}. For presentation convenience, we further
introduce the concept of side market.
Definition 1 (Side Market). The side market (subgraph) of a contract user set n⊆N , denoted
by Gsn = (Vsn,E sn), is a subgraph of the spot market, consisting of all spot market users except the
neighbors of contract users n.
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Here, the “neighbors” of n refer to spot market users connecting to at least one contract user in
the set n. It is easy to see that Vsn1 ⊆Vsn2 ⊆Vs for any n2 ⊆n1 ⊆N , since a neighbor of n2 must
be a neighbor of n1 if n2 ⊆n1. In Fig. 1, we have Vc = {1,2,3,4}, Vs = {5,6,7,8}, and examples of
side markets include Vs{1} = {6,7,8} and Vs{1,2,3} = {7,8}. Obviously, Vs{1,2,3} ⊆Vs{1} ⊆Vs.
Let I(G) and C(G) denote the sets of all independent sets and all cliques of a graph G, respec-
tively.17 Then, the spatial interference constraint can be defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Spatial Interference Constraint – SIC). Any two SUs in a clique of G can-
not use the same spectrum simultaneously; on the other hand, all SUs in an independent set of G
can use the same spectrum simultaneously.
Finally, we list the key assumption on the network topology or graph G below.
Assumption 6. We assume that the network topology G is exogenously given, and remains
unchanged during the whole period of interest.
This corresponds to a static or quasi-static network scenario, in which SUs do not move or
move slowly. With this assumption, it is reasonable to assume that the network topology is public
information to the SR.
3.5. Valuation
The valuation of an SU i over a spectrum chkt reflects the SU’s preference for the transmission
rate (capacity) achieved on spectrum chkt. Specifically, it is determined by two factors: (i) the
transmission rate of SU i over spectrum chkt (denoted by ri,kt), reflecting how efficiently SU i
utilizes spectrum chkt; and (ii) the user preference of SU i (denoted by αi,kt), reflecting how eagerly
SU i desires for spectrum chkt. To avoid confusion, we use notation vm,kt and un,kt to denote the
valuations of spot market user m and contract user n over spectrum chkt, respectively. Formally,
we can write the valuations vm,kt and un,kt as generic functions:
vm,kt , gm
(
rm,kt, αm,kt
)
and un,kt , gn
(
rn,kt, αn,kt
)
, (4)
where gi(·) is the generic valuation function of SU i, which generally increases in both the trans-
mission rate and the user preference. Typical examples of valuation function include: (a) linear
functions, e.g., gi(r,α) = α · r; (b) sigmoid functions, e.g., gi(r,α) = α · 11+er0−r ; and (c) step func-
tions, e.g., gi(r,α) = α if r exceeds a certain threshold r0, and 0 otherwise.
The user preference αi,kt is a subjective feeling of SU i for spectrum chkt, and is related to
factors such as traffic state, urgency, and importance. The transmission rate ri,kt is an objective
attribute of spectrum chkt for SU i, and is related to a spectrum-specific quality qkt and a user-
specific channel coefficient hi,kt. The qkt is common for all SUs, regarding factors such as channel
Gao, Shou, Chen, and Huang: A Hybrid Market Approach to Dynamic Spectrum Access
16 Operations Research 00(0), pp. 000–000, c© 0000 INFORMS
bandwidth, noise level, and power constraint. The hi,kt is usually independent between different
SUs, regarding factors such as path loss, shadow fading, and small scale fading (or multiple-path
effect). Typically, ri,kt is given by the Shannon-Hartley theorem (see Shannon (2001)):
ri,kt =Bk · log
(
1 +
Pi·|Hi,kt|2
σ2
kt
)
, (5)
where Bk is the channel bandwidth, Pi is the transmission power, σ
2
kt is the noise level over spectrum
chkt (captured by the common spectrum quality qkt), and |Hi,kt|2 is the channel gain of SU i over
spectrum chkt (captured by the user-specific channel coefficient hi,kt).
By (4) and (5), an SU’s valuation (over a spectrum) is essentially a joint function of the common
spectrum quality, user-specific channel coefficient, and user preference. For notational convenience,
we will write it as vm,kt , gm
(
qkt, hm,kt, αm,kt
)
and un,kt , gn
(
qkt, hn,kt, αn,kt
)
. In general, the spec-
trum quality, user-specific channel coefficient, and user preference change randomly across time
and frequency. For simplicity, the following assumptions are used in our work.
Assumption 7. The spectrum quality, user-specific channel coefficient (of every SU), and user-
preference (of every SU) are all i.i.d. across time and channels.
Based on the above assumption, we can see that the valuation of each SU is also i.i.d. across time
and channels.18 Let random variable q denote the spectrum quality, hi and αi denote the user-
specific channel coefficient and preference of SU i. Let random variables vm , gm
(
q,hm,αm
)
and
un , gn
(
q,hn,αn
)
denote the valuations of spot market user m and contract user n, respectively.
We can further see that the valuations of different SUs (over the same spectrum) are partially
correlated by the common spectrum quality q. That is, the valuation of each spectrum is partially
correlated across users. Such a valuation formulation generalizes both the case of independent user
valuation (by removing the uncertainty of q) and the case of completely correlated user valuation
(by removing the uncertainty of hi and αi, ∀i).
Let random vector Θ , (v1, ...,vM ;u1, ...,uN) denote the valuations (vector) of all SUs, and
θkt ,
(
v1,kt, ..., vM,kt; u1,kt, ..., uN,kt
)
denote a realization of Θ on spectrum chkt. As will be shown
later, in the spot market, the valuation vm,kt uniquely reflects the SU m’s maximum willingness-
to-pay (or utility) for the spectrum chkt. In the futures market, however, the valuation un,kt only
partially reflects the SU n’s maximum willingness-to-pay (or utility) for the spectrum chkt, which
depends also on the total number of spectrums that he obtains. Since each spectrum chkt is fully
characterized by the utility vector θkt and its availability ξkt, we also refer to {θkt, ξkt} as the
information of spectrum chkt. Formally,
Definition 3 (Network Information). The information of each spectrum chkt consists of its
availability and the valuations of all SUs over that spectrum, i.e., {θkt, ξkt}. The information of all
spectrums in Q is referred to as the network information, i.e., {θkt, ξkt}k∈{1,...,K},t∈{1,...,T}.
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For convenience, we will refer to a spectrum with information {θkt, ξkt} as spectrum {θkt, ξkt}.
Note that the private information of a contract user n (or spot market user m) is defined as his or
her valuation un,kt (or vm,kt) for each spectrum chkt. That is, we consider all other information of
a contract user (e.g., the spectrum demand) as public information. It is important to note that in
a broad sense, we can generalize our current analytical framework by allowing multi-dimensional
private information, as we adopt a general VCG framework in the later analysis.
3.6. Spectrum Efficiency
When the SR leases an idle licensed spectrum to an SU for secondary utilization, the SU achieves
a certain benefit, called SU-surplus, which equals the difference between the total utility achieved
from using these spectrums and the payment transferred to the related PU; the PU also achieves
a certain benefit, called PU-surplus, which equals the difference between the payment from the SU
and the cost of holding spectrum and sharing spectrum with unlicensed SUs.19 The social surplus
generated by such a process is the sum of the SU-surplus and the PU-surplus, which equals the
difference between the (SU) utility generated and the (PU) cost involved. That is:
Social Surplus = SU Surplus + PU Surplus = SU Utility−PU Cost.
Notice that the PU’s cost is a constant (sunk cost) independent of the secondary spectrum alloca-
tion. Without loss of generality, we normalize it to zero. As a result, the social surplus is equivalent
to the utility generated by the SU. Next we define the utility of each SU formally.
Utility of Spot Market User. In the spot market, based on the characteristics of elastic traffic,
an SU achieves an immediate utility from any spectrum allocated, and such a utility is directly
related to his or her valuation of the spectrum. Thus, the total utility of a spot market user m
(denoted by wsm) can be directly defined as the total valuation achieved:
20
wsm =
∑K
k=1
∑T
t=1 a
s
m,kt · vm,kt · ξkt, (6)
where asm,kt ∈ {0,1} indicates whether to allocate a spectrum chkt to SU m. The factor ξkt means
that only the idle spectrums can be used by SUs.
Utility of Contract User. In the futures market, however, an SU’s utility is not only related to
the valuation that he or she achieves, but also related to the total number of spectrums that he or
she obtains. First, depending on the requirement of inelastic traffic, an SU achieves a fixed total
utility if the number of allocated spectrums meets (or exceeds) the demand; otherwise the SU
suffers certain utility loss. Such a utility is usually referred to as the demand-related utility, which
coincides with the SU’s payment defined in the contract, i.e., Eq. (2).21 For convenience, we will
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use the notation D‡n, B
‡
n, P̂
‡
n, and B̂
‡
n to denote the spectrum demand, the fixed total utility when
the demand is satisfied, the unit utility loss (for soft contract) and the fixed total utility loss (for
hard contract) when the demand is not satisfied, respectively. Since we do not address the problem
of contract design in this work, we simply consider that each contract coincides perfectly with the
contract user’s utility definition, i.e., D‡n =Dn, B
‡
n =Bn, P̂
‡
n = P̂n, and B̂
‡
n = B̂n. Thus, the total
demand-related utility of a contract user n (denoted by wcn) has exactly the same form as his actual
payment in the contract, that is:
wcn =Bn−P(dn,Dn) =Bn−P
(∑K
k=1
∑T
t=1 a
c
n,kt · ξkt, Dn
)
, (7)
where acn,kt ∈ {0,1} indicates whether to allocate a spectrum chkt to SU n, dn ,
∑K
k=1
∑T
t=1 a
c
n,kt ·ξkt
is the total number of idle spectrums allocated to the SU n, and P(dn,Dn) is the potential utility
loss of the SU caused by the unmet demand, that is:
P(dn,Dn) = (1−Jn) · [Dn− dn]+ · P̂n +Jn ·1(Dn− dn) · B̂n. (8)
which has the same form as the SR’s potential penalty defined in (3).
Second, similar as spot market users, a contract user’s utility is also related to the valuation
that he or she can achieve on the allocated spectrum (or equivalently, the quality of the allocated
spectrum). The reason is following: to achieve a desirable quality-of-service (QoS), a contract user
needs to pay different levels of efforts (e.g., transmission powers) on spectrums with different
qualities. For example, he may achieve the desirable QoS with a lower effort on a spectrum with a
higher quality, hence lead to a higher utility. Such a utility is referred to as the quality-based utility.
Similar as that of spot market users, the total quality-based utility of a contract user n (denoted
by w˜cn) can be defined as the total valuation achieved:
w˜cn =
∑K
k=1
∑T
t=1 a
c
n,kt ·un,kt · ξkt. (9)
To capture the above two factors in a contract user’s utility, we define the utility of contract
user n as a weighted sum of the demand-related utility wcn and the quality-based utility w˜
c
n, i.e.,
τn ·wcn + (1− τn) · w˜cn,
where τn ∈ [0,1] is the factor weighting wcn and w˜cn. Such a utility definition is flexible in capturing
contract users’ different preferences regarding spectrum demand and spectrum quality.
The spectrum secondary utilization efficiency (or spectrum efficiency) is the aggregate utility of
all SUs, also called social welfare. Specifically, we have the following:
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Definition 4 (Spectrum Efficiency). The spectrum efficiency (or social welfare) is
W ,
M∑
m=1
wsm +
N∑
n=1
(
τn ·wcn + (1− τn) · w˜cn
)
, (10)
given any spectrum allocation {ai,kt}i∈M⋃N ,k∈{1,...,K},t∈{1,...,T} that is feasible.22
Based on the above, the spectrum efficiency maximization (SEM) problem can be defined as fol-
lows: finding a feasible spectrum allocation {ai,kt}i∈M⋃N ,k∈{1,...,K},t∈{1,...,T}, such that the spectrum
efficiency W defined in (10) is maximized.
4. Problem Formulation
We first formulate the spectrum efficiency maximization (SEM) problem under deterministic (com-
plete) network information (Section 4.1), which is essentially a matching problem, and can be solved
by many existing algorithms. Then we formulate the expected spectrum efficiency maximization (E-
SEM) problem under stochastic network information (Section 4.2), which is an infinite-dimensional
optimization problem. We will focus on solving the E-SEM problem in Section 5.
4.1. Problem Formulation under Deterministic Information
With complete and deterministic network information, i.e., {θkt, ξkt}k∈{1,...,K},t∈{1,...,T}, the spec-
trum efficiency maximization (SEM) problem can be formulated as a matching between all spec-
trums and all SUs, and the optimal solution explicitly specifies the allocation of every spectrum
to a particular set of (independent) SUs. Let asm,kt ∈ {0,1} (or acn,kt ∈ {0,1}) indicate whether to
allocate a spectrum chkt to spot market user m (or contract user n). Denote:
akt ,
(
as1,kt, ..., a
s
M,kt; a
c
1,kt, ..., a
c
N,kt
)
as the allocation (vector) of spectrum chkt, which contains the allocation of spectrum chkt to every
SU. An allocation strategy consists of the allocations of all spectrums in the whole time period,
denoted by Adet , {akt}k∈{1,...,K},t∈{1,...,T}. Intuitively, the allocation strategy Adet is a mapping
from every particular spectrum chkt to an allocation vector akt.
By the Spatial Interference Constraint (SIC) given in Definition 2, an allocation strategy Adet
is feasible, if and only if the allocation akt for every spectrum chkt satisfies:
SIC :
∑
m∈Ci
⋂M asm,kt +∑n∈Ci⋂N acn,kt ≤ ξkt, ∀Ci ∈ C(G), (11)
where Ci is the i-th clique of graph G, and C1i , Ci
⋂M and C2i , Ci⋂N denote the spot market
user set and contract user set in Ci, respectively. It is easy to see that asm,kt = acn,kt ≡ 0, ∀m,n, if
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ξkt = 0 (i.e., chkt is not idle). Intuitively, (11) states that (i) only idle spectrums can be used by
SUs, and (ii) every idle spectrum can be allocated to, at most, one SU in a clique.
According to the definition of spectrum efficiency in Definition 4 and the SIC in (11), the spec-
trum efficiency maximization (SEM) problem can be formally defined as follows:
SEM : A∗det = arg max
Adet
W = arg max
Adet
M∑
m=1
wsm +
N∑
n=1
(
τn ·wcn + (1− τn) · w˜cn
)
s.t. asm,kt ∈ {0,1}, acn,kt ∈ {0,1}, ∀m∈M, ∀n∈N , ∀k∈{1,...,K}, ∀t∈{1,...,T},
SIC defined in (11), ∀k∈{1,...,K}, ∀t∈{1,...,T},
Dn ≥ dn, ∀n∈N ,
(12)
where dn ,
∑K
k=1
∑T
t=1 a
c
n,kt · ξkt is the number of spectrums allocated to contract user n. The last
constraint in (12) states that none of the contract users will get spectrums more than his or her
demand. The reason for this is that over-allocation brings trivial welfare gain for contract users. It
is easy to see that the above problem is an 0-1 integer linear programming (also called matching
problem), and many algorithms, e.g., branch-and-bound algorithm and Kuhn-Munkres algorithm
(see Munkres (1957)), have been developed to solve a matching problem effectively. Due to space
limitations, we omit the details here.
4.2. Problem Formulation under Stochastic Information
In practice, the assumption of complete and deterministic information is often unreasonable, as
the network changes randomly over time. Hence, in this section we consider the case in which the
network information is stochastic and the SR only knows its distribution, but not realization. In
this case, we formulate the expected spectrum efficiency maximization (E-SEM) problem based on
the stochastic distribution (e.g., PDF or CDF) of network information.23 The solution specifies the
allocation of any spectrum under every possible information realization (rather than the explicit
allocation of every particular spectrum). In this sense, it essentially defines a contingency plan (also
called a policy) for allocating every spectrum under every possible information realization.
Based on the above, we can define the allocation strategy as a mapping from every possible
information realization (rather than every particular spectrum, as under deterministic information)
to an allocation vector consisting of the allocation probability to every SU. However, as shown in
Gao et al. (2012b), such a primitive definition is not appropriate due to the high complexity in
determining the SIC constraint.
To this end, we propose a new definition for the allocation strategy. The basic idea is to consider
each independent SU set as a virtual player, and decide the spectrum allocation among the virtual
players. That is, we transform the primitive allocation strategy, regarding the allocation probability
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(of every information realization) to every SU, into an equivalent strategy, regarding the allocation
probability to every independent SU set.
Denote Ii ∈ I(G) as the i-th independent set of the graph G, and I , |I(G)| as the total number
of independent sets in the graph G. Let aISi (θ, ξ) ∈ [0,1] denote the allocation probability of a
spectrum {θ, ξ} to independent SU set Ii. The allocation probability vector of spectrum {θ, ξ} is:
aIS(θ, ξ),
(
aIS1 (θ, ξ), a
IS
2 (θ, ξ), ..., a
IS
I (θ, ξ)
)
,
and the new allocation strategy can be formally defined as follows.
Definition 5 (Allocation Strategy). An allocation strategy is a mapping from every infor-
mation realization {θ, ξ} to a vector aIS(θ, ξ) consisting of the allocation probability of a spectrum
{θ, ξ} to every independent SU set, denoted by AIS , {aIS(θ, ξ)}θ∈Θ,ξ∈{0,1}.
Since the SUs in an independent set can use the same spectrum simultaneously, we can easily
find that strategy AIS is feasible, if the allocation aIS(θ, ξ) for every spectrum {θ, ξ} satisfies:
∑I
i=1 a
IS
i (θ, ξ)≤ ξ. (13)
That is, the condition in (13) is sufficient for a feasible allocation strategy. The next question is
whether it is able to represent all feasible allocations. The answer is YES, as shown below.
Proposition 1. Any feasible allocation can be represented by an allocation strategy (defined in
Definition 5) subject to the condition in (13).
For detailed proof, please refer to Gao et al. (2012b). Proposition 1 implies that the condition in
(13) is an effective SIC constraint. From Proposition 1, we can see that the main advantage of such
a transformation is that we can systematically identify the necessary and sufficient conditions of
a feasible allocation strategy (i.e., the SIC constraint), which is essential for the E-SEM problem
formulation. Certainly, this will bring some challenges, among which the most critical one is that
the problem of finding all independent sets is NP-hard. This motivates our later study on the
approximate algorithm and the associated performance loss analysis.
Next we can provide the E-SEM problem formulation based on the new allocation strategy. Let
lin ∈ {0,1} (or lim ∈ {0,1}) indicate whether a contract user n (or spot market user m) belongs
to the i-th independent set, i.e., lin = 1 if n ∈ Ii, and lin = 0 otherwise. Then, the total allocation
probability of spectrum {θ, ξ} to contract users n or spot market user m can be written as:
asm(θ, ξ) =
∑I
i=1 l
i
m · aISi (θ, ξ) and acn(θ, ξ) =
∑I
i=1 l
i
n · aISi (θ, ξ). (14)
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Given a feasible allocation strategy AIS, the expected welfare generated by a spot market m is:
E[wsm] =
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
1∑
ξkt=0
fξ(ξkt) · ξkt
∫
θkt
asm(θkt, ξkt) · vm(θkt) · fΘ(θkt)dθkt
= S ·
1∑
ξ=0
fξ(ξ) · ξ
∫
θ
asm(θ, ξ) · vm(θ) · fΘ(θ)dθ
= ρS ·
∫
θ
asm(θ,1) · vm(θ) · fΘ(θ)dθ,
(15)
where vm(θ) is the spot market user m’s utility (i.e., the m-th element) in the utility vector θ =
(v1, ..., vM ; u1, ..., uN), and fΘ(θ) is the joint PDF of Θ, i.e., fΘ(θ),
∏M
m=1 fvm(vm)
∏N
n=1 fun(un).
The second equation follows because ξ and Θ are i.i.d. across time and channels. The third equa-
tion follows because (i) fξ(ξ) = 1 − ρ if ξ = 0 and (ii) fξ(ξ) = ρ if ξ = 1. Note that we write
dv1...dvMdu1...duN as dθ and
∫
v1
...
∫
vM
∫
u1
...
∫
uN
as
∫
θ
for convenience.
The expected number of spectrums allocated to a contract user n is:24
E[dn] =
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
1∑
ξkt=0
fξ(ξkt) · ξkt
∫
θkt
acn(θkt, ξkt) · fΘ(θkt)dθkt
= ρS ·
∫
θ
acn(θ,1) · fΘ(θ)dθ.
(16)
Then, the expected demand-related utility generated by a contract user n is:
E[wcn] =Bn−P(E[dn],Dn), (17)
where P(E[dn],Dn) is defined in (8). Note that the above utility formula is based on the expected
number of spectrums that the contract user n obtains, rather than the explicit number as in (7).
The major motivation for this assumption is discussed in Section 3.3.
The expected quality-based utility generated by a contract user n is:
E[w˜cn] =
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
1∑
ξkt=0
fξ(ξkt) · ξkt
∫
θkt
acn(θkt, ξkt) ·un(θkt) · fΘ(θkt)dθkt
= ρS ·
∫
θ
acn(θ,1) ·un(θ) · fΘ(θ)dθ,
(18)
where un(θ) denotes the contract user n’s valuation in the vector θ= (v1, ..., vM ; u1, ..., uN).
The expected spectrum efficiency (expected social welfare) is the expected aggregate utility
generated by all SUs, that is:
E[W ],
∑M
m=1E[wsm] +
∑N
n=1
(
τn ·E[wcn] + (1− τn) ·E[w˜cn]
)
.
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Therefore, we have the following expected spectrum efficiency maximization (E-SEM) problem:
E-SEM : A∗IS = arg max
AIS
E[W ] = arg max
AIS
M∑
m=1
E[wsm] +
N∑
n=1
(
τn ·E[wcn] + (1− τn) ·E[w˜cn]
)
s.t. aISi (θ, ξ)∈ [0,1], ∀θ ∈Θ,∀ξ ∈ {0,1},∀i∈ {1, ..., I},∑I
i=1 a
IS
i (θ, ξ)≤ ξ, ∀θ ∈Θ,∀ξ ∈ {0,1}, (SIC)
Dn ≥E[dn], ∀n∈N .
(19)
Obviously, the E-SEM problem (19) is an infinite-dimensional optimization problem (see Fat-
torini (1999)), in which the solution (or strategy) is not a number or a vector, but rather a
continuous quantity. By the second constraint (SIC), we immediately have: aISi (θ, ξ)≡ 0 if ξ = 0,
∀θ ∈Θ,∀i = 1, ..., I. Therefore, in the rest of this paper, we will focus on solving aISi (θ,1),∀θ ∈
Θ,∀i= 1, ..., I, i.e., the allocation of idle spectrums, denoted by AIS,1 , {aIS(θ,1)}θ∈Θ. For nota-
tional convenience, we will write the tuple {θ,1} as θ, and thus denote AIS,1 , {aIS(θ)}θ∈Θ.
5. Off-line Optimal Policy
In this section, we solve the E-SEM problem given in (19). We first reduce the strategy space
by removing some irrelevant strategies, so as to reduce the computational complexity.25 Then we
derive the optimal solution systemically using the primal-dual method. Due to space limits, we
present all proofs in Gao et al. (2012b).
5.1. Allocation Strategy Reduction
Now we simplify the E-SEM problem (19) by restricting our attention to a particular subset of
the strategy space. Define the weight of each vertex in the graph G as the utility of the associated
SU. Notice that the welfare generated by a spot market user is exactly his or her utility, and thus
we have: if an idle spectrum θ (or spectrum {θ,1}) is allocated to an independent contract user
set n ∈ I(Gc), it must be allocated to an MWIS of the side market Gsn at the same time. This
observation helps us to eliminate some strategies without affecting the optimality of the solution.
Let I1i , Ii
⋂M and I2i , Ii⋂N denote the spot market user set and contract user set in Ii
(i.e., the i-th independent set of graph G), respectively. Formally, we have:
Proposition 2. Suppose A∗IS,1 = {a∗IS(θ)}θ∈Θ, where a∗IS(θ) =
(
aIS1
∗
(θ), ..., aISI
∗
(θ)
)
, is an optimal
solution of (19). Then for any θ ∈Θ we have: for every independent set Ii ∈ I(G),
(a) If I1i is not an MWIS of the graph GsI2i (i.e., the side market (see Definition 1) of the contract
user set I2i ), then aISi ∗(θ) = 0; or equivalently,
(b) If aISi
∗
(θ)> 0, then I1i must be an MWIS of the graph GsI2i .
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Proposition 2 implies that in an optimal solution, an idle spectrum θ will never be allocated
to an independent set Ii = I1i
⋃I2i where I1i is not an MWIS of the graph GsI2i . We refer to such
an independent set Ii as an irrelevant independent set. Obviously, we can ignore those allocation
strategies that allocate spectrums to the irrelevant independent sets, and focus only on the alloca-
tion among the “relevant” independent sets Ii (where I1i is an MWIS of the graph GsI2i ). In effect,
we can restrict our attention to the independent sets of the futures market graph Gc, instead of
the independent sets of the whole graph G: if a spectrum is allocated to an independent contract
user set (say n) of Gc, it must be allocated to an MWIS of the side market graph Gsn at the same
time. Consider the example in Fig. 1. Any idle spectrum will not be allocated to the independent
set Ii = {1, 6}, since {6} is not an MWIS of Gs{1}; otherwise, we can immediately increase the total
welfare by reallocating the spectrum to another independent set Ij = {1, 6, 8}.
The above result allows us to simplify the E-SEM problem. Denote Ici ∈ I(Gc) as the i-th
independent contract user set of the futures market graph Gc, and Ic , |I(Gc)| as the total number
of independent sets of the graph Gc. Let aISci (θ)∈ [0,1] denote the allocation probability of an idle
spectrum θ to the i-th independent contract user set Ici . 26 Formally, we can define the reduced
allocation strategy as AISc , {aISc(θ)}θ∈Θ, where
aISc(θ),
(
aISc0 (θ), a
ISc
1 (θ), ..., a
ISc
Ic
(θ)
)
is the reduced allocation probability vector of an idle spectrum θ, consisting of the allocation
probability of spectrum {θ,1} to every independent contract user set of the graph Gc. Note that
the 0-th independent contract user set is simply defined as the empty set, i.e., Ic0 = ∅.
Similar to (13), a reduced allocation strategy AISc is feasible, if and only if for every information
realization {θ,1}, the reduced allocation probability vector aISc(θ) satisfies:
SIC :
∑Ic
i=0 a
ISc
i (θ)≤ 1. (20)
By Proposition 2, if an idle spectrum θ is allocated to the i-th independent contract user set Ici ,
it must be allocated to an MWIS of the side market graph GsIci (denoted by I
s
i ) at the same time.
Let zi(θ) denote the total weight of Isi . Obviously, zi(θ) is the maximum total welfare generated by
spot market users in the side market GsIci (over an idle spectrum θ), referred to as the side welfare
of Ici .27 Thus, given a feasible strategy AISc, the expected side welfare of Ici is:
E[W si ] =
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
1∑
ξkt=0
fξ(ξkt) · ξkt
∫
θkt
aISci (θkt, ξkt) · zi(θkt) · fΘ(θkt)dθkt
= ρS · ∫
θ
aISci (θ) · zi(θ) · fΘ(θ)dθ.
(21)
Gao, Shou, Chen, and Huang: A Hybrid Market Approach to Dynamic Spectrum Access
Operations Research 00(0), pp. 000–000, c© 0000 INFORMS 25
The expected social welfare generated by the spot market is the sum of the expected side welfare
of all independent contract user sets (including the empty set), that is:
E[W s] =
∑Ic
i=0E[W si ] =
∑Ic
i=0
(
ρS · ∫
θ
aISci (θ) · zi(θ) · fΘ(θ)dθ
)
. (22)
Similar to (14), the allocation probability of an idle spectrum θ to a contract users n is:
acn(θ) =
∑Ic
i=0 l
i
n · aISci (θ) =
∑Ic
i=1 l
i
n · aISci (θ). (23)
The 2nd equality follows because l0n ≡ 0, ∀n∈N (since Ic0 = ∅). Furthermore, the expected number
of spectrums allocated to contract user n (i.e., E[dn]) and the expected utility generated by contract
user n (i.e., E[wn] and E[w˜n]) are given by (16)-(18) directly. The expected spectrum efficiency is:
E[W ] =
∑Ic
i=0E[W si ] +
∑N
n=1
(
τn ·E[wcn] + (1− τn) ·E[w˜cn]
)
, (24)
Based on the reduced allocation strategy AISc and the associated expected spectrum efficiency
formula in (24), we can rewrite the E-SEM in (19) into the following equivalent form:
E-SEM(EQ) : A∗ISc = arg max
AISc
E[W ] = arg max
AISc
Ic∑
i=0
E[W si ] +
N∑
n=1
(
τn ·E[wcn] + (1− τn) ·E[w˜cn]
)
s.t. (i) aISci (θ)∈ [0,1], ∀θ ∈Θ,∀i∈ {0,1, ..., Ic},
(ii)
∑Ic
i=0 a
ISc
i (θ)≤ 1, ∀θ ∈Θ, (SIC)
(iii) Dn ≥E[dn], ∀n∈N .
(25)
Notice that the independent sets in the futures market graph Gc are much less than in the whole
graph G, since the number of independent sets increases exponentially with the number of vertices.
Thus, by (25), we can greatly reduce the complexity of the E-SEM problem in (19). Recall the
example in Fig. 1, there are a total of 26 independent sets in graph G, while only 6 in graph Gc.
5.2. Necessary Conditions
For exposition convenience, we will omit the superscript “Isc” in aISci (θ), as long as there is no con-
fusion caused. Suppose A∗ISc = {a∗ISc(θ)}θ∈Θ where a∗ISc(θ) =
(
a∗0(θ), a
∗
1(θ), ..., a
∗
Ic
(θ)
)
is the optimal
solution to (25). The following necessary conditions hold.
Lemma 1 (Necessary Condition I). For any θ ∈Θ, we have: ∑Ici=0 a∗i (θ) = 1.
Intuitively, Lemma 1 states that every idle spectrum will be allocated to SUs. This is because it
can always produce certain positive utility when used by some SUs, e.g., spot market users.
Lemma 2 (Necessary Condition II). For any contract user n, we have: E[dn]≤Dn.
Intuitively, Lemma 2 states that none of the contract users will get spectrums (on average) more
than his or her demand. This is because spectrum over-allocation to a contract user brings trivial
utility gain for the contract user (see the definition of contract user’s utility in Eq. [17]).
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5.3. Optimal Solution
We focus on the optimal solution for soft contracts (with unit utility loss for every under-allocated
spectrum). The analysis for hard contracts (with a fixed total utility loss for the unsatisfaction in
demand) is similar and shown in Gao et al. (2012b).
By Lemma 1, we can replace the decision variable a0(θ) by a0(θ) = 1−
∑Ic
i=1 ai(θ). By Lemma 2,
we can rewrite the potential welfare loss in (8) as P(dn,Dn) = (Dn−E[dn]) · P̂n (for soft contracts).
Furthermore, by the 2nd constraint of the problem (25), we can simplify the 1st constraint as
ai(θ)≥ 0, ∀i. Thus, the optimization problem (25) can be rewritten as:
A∗ISc’ = arg max
AISc’
(
ρS
∫
θ
(
1−∑Ici=1 ai(θ))z0(θ)fΘ(θ)dθ+∑Ici=1 ρS ∫θ ai(θ)zi(θ)fΘ(θ)dθ
+
∑N
n=1
[
τn ·
(
Bn− (Dn−E[dn]) · P̂n
)
+ (1− τn) · ρS
∫
θ
acn(θ)un(θ)fΘ(θ)dθ
])
= arg max
AISc’
(
F + ρS ·∑Ici=1 ∫θHi(θ)ai(θ)fΘ(θ)dθ),
s.t. (i) ai(θ)≥ 0, ∀θ ∈Θ,∀i∈ {1, ..., Ic};
(ii)
∑Ic
i=1 ai(θ)≤ 1, ∀θ ∈Θ;
(iii) E[dn]≤Dn, ∀n∈N ;
(26)
where
• AISc’ = {aISc’(θ)}θ∈Θ with aISc’(θ) =
(
a1(θ), ..., aIc(θ)
)
is the reduced allocation strategy;
• E[dn] = ρS
∫
θ
acn(θ)fΘ(θ)dθ=
∑Ic
i=1 l
i
n ·ρS
∫
θ
ai(θ) ·fΘ(θ)dθ is the expected number of spectrums
allocated to the contract user n;
• F = ρS ·∫
θ
z0(θ)fΘ(θ)dθ+
∑N
n=1 τn ·
(
Bn− P̂n ·Dn
)
is a constant independent of the allocation;
• Hi(θ) =−z0(θ) + zi(θ) +
∑N
n=1 l
i
n ·
(
τn · P̂n + (1− τn) ·un(θ)
)
is an information-specific variable.
To analytically solve the optimization problem (26), we first study the dual problem of (26)
using the primal-dual method (see Dantzig (1998) for details). Then we determine the optimal dual
variables, from which we further derive the optimal primal solution.
5.3.1. Primal-Dual Method We introduce Lagrange multipliers (also called dual variables
or shadow prices) µi(θ), η(θ), and λn for three constraints in (26). The Lagrangian is:
Lag= F + ρS ·∑Ici=1 ∫θHi(θ)ai(θ)fΘ(θ)dθ+∑Ici=1 ∫θ µi(θ)ai(θ)fΘ(θ)dθ
+
∫
θ
η(θ)
(
1−∑Ici=1 ai(θ))fΘ(θ)dθ+∑Nn=1 λn(Dn−∑Ici=1 lin · ρS ∫θ ai(θ) · fΘ(θ)dθ),
which can be written as Lag,
∫
θ
W(θ)fΘ(θ)dθ, where W(θ), called Sub-Lagrangian, is given by
W(θ), F + η(θ) +∑Nn=1 λnDn +∑Ici=1 (ρS ·Hi(θ) +µi(θ)− η(θ)− ρS ·∑Nn=1 linλn) · ai(θ).
Definition 6 (Marginal Welfare – MW). We define the marginal welfare (MW) as the first
partial derivative of W(θ) over each independent contract user set’s allocation probability ai(θ):
w˙i(θ), ∂W(θ)∂ai(θ) = ρS ·Hi(θ) +µi(θ)− η(θ)− ρS ·
∑N
n=1 l
i
n ·λn. (27)
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By Euler-Lagrange conditions for optimality (see Dantzig (1998)), if an inner optimal solu-
tion exists, the optimal solution A∗ISc’(θ) must satisfy the conditions: w˙i(θ) = 0,∀i; otherwise, the
optimal solution occurs at the boundaries. From Definition 6, we can see that the MW w˙i(θ) is
independent of AISc’(θ). Thus, the optimal solution A
∗
ISc’(θ) must occur at the boundaries, that is:
a∗i (θ) =
{
0, w˙i(θ)< 0
1, w˙i(θ)> 0
(28)
By (27) and (28), the optimal solution is determined by the dual variables µi(θ), η(θ), and λn. By
the primal-dual method (Dantzig (1998)), every dual variable must be nonnegative and is positive
only when the associated constraint is tight, i.e., the following dual constraints hold:
(D.1) µ∗i (θ)≥ 0, a∗i (θ)≥ 0, µ∗i (θ) · a∗i (θ) = 0, ∀i∈ {1, ..., Ic},∀θ ∈Θ;
(D.2) η∗(θ)≥ 0, 1−∑Ici=1 a∗i (θ)≥ 0, η∗(θ) · (1−∑Ici=1 a∗i (θ))= 0, ∀θ ∈Θ;
(D.3) λ∗n ≥ 0, Dn−
∑Ic
i=1 l
i
n · ρS
∫
θ
a∗i (θ) · fΘ(θ)dθ≥ 0,
λ∗n ·
(
Dn−
∑Ic
i=1 l
i
n · ρS
∫
θ
a∗i (θ) · fΘ(θ)dθ
)
= 0, ∀n∈N .
By the duality principle, the primal problem (26) is equivalent to the problem of finding a set
of optimal dual variables µ∗i (θ), η
∗(θ), and λ∗n, such that all dual constraints are satisfied (dual
problem). The optimality of this approach is guaranteed as the objective and constraints in (26)
are linear, which implies that (26) is a convex optimization problem.
For convenience, we further introduce the concepts of inner marginal welfare (I-MW) and core
marginal welfare (C-MW), which will be frequently used in the later discussion.
Definition 7 (Inner Marginal Welfare – I-MW).
w˙Ini (θ), ρS ·Hi(θ)− η(θ)− ρS ·
∑N
n=1 l
i
n ·λn. (29)
Definition 8 (Core Marginal Welfare – C-MW).
w˙Coi (θ), ρS ·Hi(θ)− ρS ·
∑N
n=1 l
i
n ·λn. (30)
It is easy to see that w˙Ini (θ) = w˙i(θ)− µi(θ) and w˙Coi (θ) = w˙i(θ)− µi(θ) + η(θ). That is, both
I-MW and C-MW are variations of MW by ignoring certain non-critical dual variables in the MW.
This is also the reason that we refer to them as “inner” and “core” marginal welfares.
5.3.2. Optimal Shadow Prices and Optimal Solution Now we study the optimal shadow
prices (dual variables) and optimal primal solution.
We start by showing the necessary conditions for the optimal µ∗i (θ). Specifically,
Lemma 3 (Feasible Range of µ∗i (θ)). The optimal shadow prices µ
∗
i (θ) must satisfy:
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(a) µ∗i (θ) = 0, if w˙
In
i (θ)≥ 0, and (b) µ∗i (θ)∈ [0, |w˙Ini (θ)|], if w˙Ini (θ)< 0.
Notice that w˙i(θ) = w˙
In
i (θ)+µ
∗
i (θ). Lemma 3 implies that (a) w˙
In
i (θ)≥ 0 if and only if w˙i(θ)≥ 0,
and (b) w˙Ini (θ)< 0 if and only if w˙i(θ)≤ 0. That is, µ∗i (θ) never changes the sign of the MW w˙i(θ),
which implies that µ∗i (θ) has no impact on the optimal solution (28). Intuitively, this is because the
optimal solution given by (28) never violates the first constraint (associated with shadow prices
µi(θ)) of the primal problem (26). To better understand Lemma 3, we provide an illustration of
w˙Ini (θ), w˙i(θ), and the feasible range of µ
∗
i (θ) (shown as the shadow area) in Fig. 3, in which Region
II corresponds to case (a), and Regions I and III correspond to case (b) in Lemma 3. In Region II,
the optimal µ∗i (θ) is 0, and thus w˙i(θ) = w˙
In
i (θ)≥ 0. In Region I or III, the optimal µ∗i (θ) is in the
shadow area, and thus w˙i(θ) = w˙
In
i (θ) +µ
∗
i (θ)≤ 0.
Next we show the necessary conditions for the optimal η∗(θ). Denote:
W˙1st(θ), max
i∈{1,...,Ic}
w˙Coi (θ) and W˙2nd(θ), max
i∈{1,...,Ic}/{i1}
w˙Coi (θ)
as the highest and second-highest C-MWs among all independent contract user sets, respectively,
where i1 , arg maxi∈{1,...,Ic} w˙Coi (θ). The feasible range of η∗(θ) is shown as follows.
Lemma 4 (Feasible Range of η∗(θ)). The optimal shadow prices η∗(θ) must satisfy:
(a) η∗(θ)∈ [max(0, W˙2nd(θ)), W˙1st(θ)], if W˙1st(θ)> 0, and (b) η∗(θ) = 0, if W˙1st(θ)≤ 0.
Notice that w˙i(θ) = w˙
Co
i (θ) + µ
∗
i (θ)− η∗(θ) and w˙Ini (θ) = w˙Coi (θ)− η∗(θ). That is, the shadow
price η∗(θ) can be viewed as an identical reduction on all C-MWs (at a particular θ). Lemma 4
suggests that a feasible η∗(θ) would lie between W˙1st(θ) and max(0, W˙2nd(θ)), with which there
is, at most, one independent contract user set (the i1-th one Ici1 , if exists) having positive I-MW,
i.e., w˙Ini (θ)≤ 0, ∀i 6= i1. We therefore have w˙i(θ)≤ 0 and a∗i (θ) = 0, ∀i 6= i1 by Lemma 3 and (28).
Thus, the coupling constraint (ii) will be satisfied. To better understand Lemma 4, we provide an
illustration of w˙Coi (θ), w˙i(θ), and η
∗(θ) (shown as the shadow areas) in Fig. 4. Here we have two
independent contract user sets, i= 1,2. The upper dash curve denotes W˙1st(θ), the highest C-MW
of two independent sets. The lower dash curve denotes W˙2nd(θ), the second highest (i.e., lowest)
C-MW of two independent sets. Regions I and II correspond to case (a) where W˙1st(θ)> 0, and the
remaining regions correspond to case (b) where W˙1st(θ)≤ 0. It is easy to see that in Region I (or
II), the 1st (or 2nd) independent set realizes the highest positive C-MW, i.e., W˙1st(θ) = w˙
Co
1 (θ)> 0
(or W˙1st(θ) = w˙
Co
2 (θ)> 0), and thus given any feasible η
∗(θ) in the shadow area, the 1st (or 2nd)
independent set has the unique positive marginal welfare.
By Lemmas 3 and 4, we can find that the optimal solution given by (28) is equivalent to such a
solution that allocates spectrums to the independent contract user set with the highest and positive
C-MW (and meanwhile the associated side market). Denote i1 , {i∈ {1, ..., Ic} | w˙Coi (θ) = W˙1st(θ)}
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Figure 4 Illustration of η∗(θ) in Lemma 4
as the collection of independent sets with the highest C-MW (over a spectrum {θ,1}). Formally,
we have the following optimal solution.
Lemma 5 (Optimal Allocation Strategy). For any idle spectrum θ, the optimal allocation
strategy A∗ISc’(θ) is given by: (i) if i /∈ i1, then a∗i (θ) = 0; and (ii) if i∈ i1, then
(ii.a) a∗i (θ)∈ [0,1] such that
∑
i∈i1 a
∗
i (θ) = 1, if W˙1st(θ)> 0;
(ii.b) a∗i (θ)∈ [0,1] such that
∑
i∈i1 a
∗
i (θ)≤ 1, if W˙1st(θ) = 0;
(ii.c) a∗i (θ) = 0, if W˙1st(θ)< 0;
Lemma 5 states that in the optimal solution, only the independent contract user sets with the
highest positive C-MW may obtain an idle spectrum θ. If the C-MW is negative for all independent
contract user sets (i.e., W˙1st(θ) < 0), the spectrum is allocated to the 0-th independent contract
user set (empty set) and the associated side market (the whole spot market). For example, in
Fig. 4, we have i1 = {1} in Regions I and I′ (on the left side of Region I) and i1 = {2} in Regions II
and II′ (on the right side of Region II). Thus, we have a∗1(θ) = a
∗
2(θ) = 0 in Regions I
′ and II′ since
W˙1st(θ)< 0; a
∗
1(θ) = 1, a
∗
2(θ) = 0 in Region I; and a
∗
1(θ) = 0, a
∗
2(θ) = 1 in Region II.
When SUs have continuous and heterogeneous utilities, the realization of θ such that W˙1st(θ) = 0
(i.e., case (b) in Lemma 5) or |i1| > 1 (i.e., multiple independent sets having the same highest
C-MP) has a zero size support, and therefore can be ignored. Thus, the optimal allocation given
by Lemma 5 is equivalent to:
a∗i (θ) = 1 if and only if w˙
Co
i (θ)> 0 and w˙
Co
i (θ)>max
j 6=i
w˙Coj (θ). (31)
Recall the example in Figure 4. There are two distinct realizations of θ such that W˙1st(θ) = 0, i.e.,
the boundary points between Region I and I′ and between Region II and II′. In addition, there is
only one distinct realization of θ such that |i1|> 1, i.e., the boundary point between Region I and
II. Obviously, these realizations have a zero size support.
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Now let us look into (31) to gain further insights. First, notice that:
w˙Coi (θ) = ρS ·
(
− z0(θ) + zi(θ) +
∑N
n=1 l
i
n ·
(
τn · P̂n + (1− τn) ·un(θ)
)−∑Nn=1 lin ·λn).
The first term z0(θ) is the side welfare (from a spectrum {θ,1}) of the 0-th independent contract
user set (empty set). That is, it is the welfare generated by the spot market users, when the
spectrum is not allocated to any contract user. In this sense, it can be viewed as an outside option
with regard to the futures market. The second term zi(θ) is the side welfare of the i-th independent
contract user set. That is, it is the welfare generated by the spot market users (in the associated
side market), when the spectrum is allocated to the i-th independent contract user set. The third
term
∑N
n=1 l
i
n ·
(
τn · P̂n+(1−τn) ·un(θ)
)
denotes the direct welfare improvement (also called welfare
gain) generated by the contract users in the i-th independent contract user set from a spectrum
{θ,1}.28 The last term ∑Nn=1 lni ·λ∗n is the shadow prices of the i-th independent contract user set,
which imposes an identical “shade” on the C-MW of the i-th independent set over all spectrums.
It is used to rule out the relatively low welfare spectrums and assign the high welfare spectrums
to the i-th independent contract user set.
Let Θ+i ,
{
θ | w˙Coi (θ)> 0 & w˙Coi (θ)>maxj 6=i w˙Coj (θ)
}
denote the set of spectrum information
θ with which the i-th independent contract user set having the unique highest and positive C-
MP. Since Θ+i is determined by the shadow prices (vector) λ
∗ , (λ∗1, ..., λ∗N), we can write Θ+i as
a function of λ∗, denoted by Θ+i (λ
∗). The optimal solution is therefore equivalent to: a∗i (θ) = 1
if and only if θ ∈Θ+i (λ∗). Accordingly, the set of spectrums allocated to a contract user n can
be written as: Θ+n =
⋃Ic
i=1 l
i
n  Θ+i , where lin  Θ+i = ∅ if lin = 0 and lin  Θ+i = Θ+i if lin = 1.
Furthermore, the expected number of spectrums allocated to a contract user n can be written as:
E[dn] = ρS
∫
θ∈Θ+n (λ∗) fΘ(θ)dθ. According to the dual constraints (D.3), the optimal shadow price
λ∗n is either 0 if the associated constraint (iii) is not tight, or otherwise a non-negative value that
makes the associated constraint tight. Formally,
Lemma 6 (Optimal Shadow Price λ∗n). The optimal shadow price λ
∗
n is given by:
λ∗n = max
{
0, argλn
(
ρS
∫
θ∈Θ+n (λ∗−n,λn)
fΘ(θ)dθ=Dn
)}
, ∀n∈N ,
where λ∗−n is the vector of all independent contract user sets’ shadow prices except that of the i-th
independent set, i.e., λ∗−n , (λ∗1, ..., λ∗n−1, λ∗n+1, ..., λ∗N).
After obtaining the optimal shadow price vector λ∗ and substituting the optimal λ∗ into the
C-MWs of all independent contract user sets, we can easily determine the optimal allocation of
any spectrum under any information {θ,1} according to Lemma 5 or (31). Intuitively, the shadow
price λ∗n imposes a vertical (downward) shift on the C-MPs of those independent sets containing
the contract user n, such that E[dn] meets the demand Dn.
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5.4. The Optimal Policy
We now summarize the optimal policy based on the optimal solution derived above. Simply speak-
ing, a policy is a set of pre-defined allocation rules, specifying explicitly or implicitly the allocation
of any spectrum under every possible information realization. We will show that the optimal solu-
tion in Lemma 5 is equivalent to such a policy that allocates every spectrum to an MWIS of the
graph G with well-defined weights. Formally, we show this in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Optimal Policy). For any idle spectrum with information realization {θ,1},
• Define the weight of each vertex of graph G in the following way:
— The weight of each spot market user m is: vm;
— The weight of each contract user n is: τn · P̂n + (1− τn) ·un(θ)−λ∗n;
• Allocate the spectrum {θ,1} to an MWIS of the weighted graph G defined above.
By the optimal policy in Theorem 1, every spectrum will be allocated to an MWIS of G, where
the weight of each vertex (SU) is defined as his current valuation directly for spot market users or
a function of his current valuation for contract users. That is, the weight is related to the realized
actual information of the current spectrum and the optimal policy only, but independent of the
information of future or past spectrums. In this sense, we disentangle the time-coupled spectrum
allocation problem (which determines the spectrum allocations in all time slots jointly based on
the complete network information) into a set of sub-problems. Each sub-problem determines the
spectrum allocation in a particular time slot based on the currently realized information and the
pre-derived optimal shadow prices. The coupling relationship of allocations in different time slots
is captured by the pre-derived optimal shadow prices (in Lemma 6).
6. On-line VCG Mechanisms
In the previous section, we have shown in Theorem 1 that the E-SEM problem can be disentangled
into a set of sub-problems, each determining the allocation of one particular spectrum. More
specifically, every spectrum is allocated to an MWIS of the graph G, in which the weight of each
vertex is related only to the utility of the associated SU over the spectrum, while independent of
his or her utilities over other spectrums or the utility of other SUs.
Obviously, if the SR can observe all of the realized information of one spectrum, it is straight-
forward to determine the optimal allocation of that spectrum, based on Theorem 1. As mentioned
previously, however, the SU’s valuation is private information, and cannot be observed by the SR.
That is, the network information is asymmetric between the SR and SUs. In this case, the real-
time allocation of every spectrum essentially depends on the SUs’ reports (also called bids) about
their valuations. SUs may have incentives to falsely report their valuations to enlarge their welfare.
Therefore, an incentive compatible mechanism is necessary for credibly eliciting the SUs’ private
valuations and then optimally allocating every spectrum.
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6.1. VCG Mechanism
We first propose a VCG auction, which is incentive-compatible for SUs to truthfully report their
private valuations, and is optimal for the real-time allocation of every spectrum. Essentially, a
VCG auction charges each SU a fee if his or her report is pivotal, i.e., if his or her report changes
the optimal allocation so as to harm other SUs. Let v˜m and u˜n denote the reports (i.e., bids) of
spot market user m and contract user n. Denote θ˜,
(
v˜1, ..., v˜M ; u˜1, ..., u˜N
)
as the bid vector of all
SUs. Formally, the VCG based spectrum allocation and charging mechanism is shown as follows.
VCG Auction. For any idle spectrum with a bid vector θ˜,
• Define the weight of each vertex of graph G in the following way:
— The weight of each spot market user m is: xm , v˜m;
— The weight of each contract user n is: xn , τn · P̂n + (1− τn) · u˜n(θ)−λ∗n;
• Allocate the spectrum to an MWIS of the above weighted graph G:
— Denote I∗ ∈ I(G) as the allocated independent set, i.e., ∑j∈I∗ xj ≥∑j∈Ii xj, ∀Ii ∈ I(G);
• Charge each SU k in the following way:
— Denote I∗−k ∈ I(G−k) as an MWIS of G−k, the graph consisting of all SUs except k;
— Charge the SU k a critical price defined as: pk ,
∑
j∈I∗−k
xj −
∑
j∈I∗/{k} xj.
The above mechanism is a standard VCG auction (see Myerson (1981)), thus leads to truth-
telling. The novelty of our VCG auction is that the bid of each contract user n is not exogenously
given, but rather related to the optimal shadow prices λ∗n derived in the previous section. Hence,
such a solution (i.e., the off-line policy and the on-line VCG auction) allows us to optimally allocate
every spectrum in an on-line manner under stochastic and asymmetric network information.
It is notable that the above spectrum auction with spatial spectrum reuse is mathematically
equivalent to the auction with single-minded buyers proposed in Nisan (2007). Specifically, in an
auction with single-minded buyers, each bidder requests a specific bundle of items, and achieves
a positive revenue if obtaining this bundle of items, and zero otherwise. We can view any two
bidders with non-conflicting requirements (i.e., there is no intersection between their requested
bundles of items) as non-conflicting (independent) buyers, based on which we can construct such
a conflict graph in which conflicting bidders are connected by an edge and non-conflicting bidders
are disconnected. Accordingly, a set of independent bidders (i.e., those not connected by edges)
can be chosen as auction winners at the same time. This is equivalent to the single-slot spectrum
auction in our work. We would like to emphasize that our work is not restricted to the study of the
single-slot spectrum auction (in a particular time slot). In fact, we focus on the auction of spectrum
in a period of T time slots. This multi-slot spectrum allocation problem is essentially a combination
of T coupled single-slot spectrum auction problems (which are coupled by the optimal shadow
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prices derived in advance). This is also the key difference between our work and the single-minded
auction in Nisan (2007).
Next we provide some comments on this mechanism. First, as shown in Section 3.3, the contract
user’s actual payment is pre-defined, and determined only by the number of spectrums that he
or she obtains, while independent of the utility. In the above VCG auction, however, the contract
user’s payment depends on his or her valuation. Actually, we can view a contract user’s payment
in the VCG auction as a subsidy that encourages the contract user to report truthfully. Second, if
an SU k is not allocated a spectrum (i.e., k /∈ I∗), then we have I∗−k = I∗, and thus his payment is
pk =
∑
j∈I∗−k
xj −
∑
j∈I∗/{k} xj = 0. Third, the above VCG auction relies on the solving of MWIS
problems, which are well-known to be NP-hard. Thus, the VCG auction may not be suitable for
large networks. This motivates us to further study a low-complexity mechanism instead.
6.2. VCG-like Mechanism
Due to the spatial spectrum reuse, the VCG auction in Mechanism 1 requires a solution to the
MWIS problem, which is NP-hard. Thus, the above VCG auction is not suitable for on-line imple-
mentation. To this end, we further propose a low-complexity VCG-like mechanism, based on
approximate MWIS algorithms with polynomial-time complexity. Formally, the VCG-like spectrum
allocation and charging mechanism works in the following way.
VCG-Like Mechanism. For any idle spectrum with a bid vector θ˜,
• Define the weight of each vertex in the graph G in the following way:
— The weight of each spot market user m is: xm , v˜m;
— The weight of each contract user n is: xn , τn · P̂n + (1− τn) · u˜n(θ)−λ∗n;
• Allocate each spectrum in the following greedy way: Define the survival SU set N † =N
— Do until N † = ∅: Allocate the spectrum to the maximum weight SU in N †, and
Remove this SU as well as the neighboring SUs from N †;
— Denote I† ∈ I(G) as the allocated independent SU set;
• Charge each SU k in the following way:
— Denote I†−k ∈ I(G−k) as the allocated SU set using the above allocation mechanism on G−k;
— Charge the SU k a critical price defined as: pk ,
∑
j∈I†−k
xj −
∑
j∈I†/{k} xj.
The key difference between this VCG-like mechanism and the previous VCG auction lies in the
allocation strategy. Specifically, in the VCG auction, every spectrum is allocated to an MWIS
of SUs; whereas, in the VCG-like mechanism, every spectrum is allocated to a set of SUs based
on a greedy algorithm. Some important observations are as follows. First, the above VCG-like
mechanism has a polynomial-time complexity. Second, the above VCG-like mechanism leads to
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truth-telling (under this greedy allocation mechanism). This can be easily proved by the mono-
tonicity property and bid-independent property (see Krishna (2009)). Third, the above VCG-like
mechanism is not optimal due to the lack of optimal algorithm for MWIS calculations. The welfare
loss caused by this non-optimal VCG-like mechanism will be studied in the next section.
7. Welfare Loss Analysis
Now we study the welfare loss induced by the approximate MWIS algorithms. We first notice
that the E-SEM problem in (25) depends only on the stochastic distribution information, and
the optimal solution (policy) can be derived in an off-line manner. That is, we can enumerate
all possible scenarios and calculate the corresponding solution beforehand. In this sense, we can
always apply the precise MWIS algorithm to compute the off-line optimal policy exactly. Hence,
the approximate MWIS algorithms only affect the real-time allocation of every spectrum (which
must be determined in an on-line manner).
In the previous section, we have proposed a specific on-line VCG-like mechanism (based on
a greedy approximate MWIS algorithm) for the real-time allocation of every spectrum. Now we
characterize the welfare loss under generic VCG-like mechanisms, or equivalently, under generic
approximate MWIS algorithms. This quantitative analysis helps us to achieve a desirable tradeoff
between performance and complexity.
7.1. Precise and Approximate C-MWs
We first examine how an approximate MWIS algorithm affects the achieved performance. By
Lemma 5, the optimal allocation of every spectrum θ relies on the accurate calculations of zi(θ),∀i=
0,1, ..., Ic, i.e., the side welfare of the i-th independent contract user set. With the above VCG-like
mechanism, however, we can only get an approximate (degraded) side welfare z˜i(θ) with certain
performance guarantee. This degradation will potentially change the relationship between C-MWs,
and further change the spectrum allocation. For example, a relatively larger (smaller) degradation
on the side welfare zi(θ) will lead to a smaller (larger) C-MW, and therefore a smaller (larger)
allocation probability to the i-th independent contract user set.
Without loss of generality, we treat the performance ratio (i.e., the ratio of the achieved perfor-
mance and the optimal performance) of the adopted approximate MWIS algorithm as a random
variable drawn from [0,1]. Let random variable i denote the performance ratio of the MWIS
problem of calculating zi(θ), and  , (0,1, ...,Ic) denote the random vector consisting of the
performance ratios of all Ic + 1 MWIS problems. Let i ∈ [0,1] denote a particular realization of
the random variable i, and , (0, 1, ..., Ic) denote a particular realization of the random vector
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. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that all performance ratios in vector 
are independent of each other, but they are not necessarily identically distributed.
For any spectrum {θ,1}, the precise C-MW of the i-th independent contract user set is
w˙Coi (θ) = ρS ·
(
− z0(θ) + zi(θ) +
∑N
n=1 l
i
n ·
(
τn · P̂n + (1− τn) ·un(θ)−λ∗n
))
, (32)
while the approximate C-MW under certain performance ratio realization of  is:
w˜
Co
i (θ) = ρS ·
(
− 0 · z0(θ) + i · zi(θ) +
∑N
n=1 l
i
n ·
(
τn · P̂n + (1− τn) ·un(θ)−λ∗n
))
. (33)
7.2. Welfare Loss and Performance Ratio
Now we study the welfare loss and the achievable performance ratio. We can divide the whole
spectrum range Θ into Ic + 1 parts based on the allocated independent contract user set under
the optimal allocation policy: (i) Θ1, i= 1, ..., Ic, the spectrums intended for the i-th independent
contract user set; and (ii) Θ0, the spectrums intended for the spot market only. Formally,{
Θi = {θ ∈Θ | w˙Coi (θ)> 0 & w˙Coi (θ)>max
j 6=i
w˙Coj (θ)}, i= 1, ..., Ic.
Θ0 = {θ ∈Θ | w˙Coi (θ)< 0,∀i= 1, ..., Ic}.
In the following, we will first derive the welfare loss (upper-bound) in each part of Θ. Then we
characterize the achievable performance ratio (lower-bound).
7.2.1. Welfare Loss in Θi We first consider the welfare loss on spectrums in Θi. Under the
optimal allocation policy based on precise C-MWs, every idle spectrum θ in Θi is allocated to the
i-th independent contract user set (and the associated side market) with an instantaneous welfare:
zi(θ) +
∑N
n=1 l
i
n · (1− τn) ·un(θ).
The first term denotes the side welfare, and the second term denotes the (quality-based) utility of
the i-th independent contract user set. Note that we ignore the demand-related utility of contract
user n, since it is constant and not affected by the mis-allocation; we also ignore the potential
utility loss induced by under-allocation here, which will be analyzed specifically later.
Obviously, with precise C-MWs (using optimal MWIS algorithms), the i-th independent contract
user set has the highest positive C-MW among all independent sets. With approximate C-MWs
(using approximate MWIS algorithms), however, there are possibly three different outcomes, each
leading to a different allocation and thus a different welfare loss. Specifically, we have the following:
(1) The i-th independent contract user set itself has the highest and positive approximate C-
MW, i.e., w˜
Co
i (θ)> 0 and w˜
Co
i (θ)>maxj 6=i w˜
Co
j (θ). In this case, the spectrum will still be allocated
to the i-th independent contract user set with a degraded instantaneous welfare i ·zi(θ)+
∑N
n=1 l
i
n ·
(1− τn) ·un(θ). Thus, the welfare loss can be written as:
ψi(θ), (1− i) · zi(θ).
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(2) The i′-th (with i′ 6= i) independent contract user set has the highest and positive approximate
C-MW, i.e., w˜
Co
i′ (θ)> 0 and w˜
Co
i′ (θ)>maxj 6=i′ w˜
Co
j (θ). In this case, the spectrum will be mistakenly
allocated to the i′-th independent set instead with an instantaneous welfare i′ · zi′(θ) +
∑N
n=1 l
i′
n ·
(1− τn) ·un(θ). Thus, the welfare loss can be written as:
ψi′(θ), zi(θ)− i′ · zi′(θ) +
∑N
n=1(l
i
n− li
′
n ) · (1− τn) ·un(θ).
(3) All independent contract user sets have the negative approximate C-MWs, i.e., w˜
Co
i (θ) <
0,∀i= 1, ..., Ic. In this case, the spectrum will be mistakenly allocated to the spot market only with
an instantaneous welfare 0 · z0(θ). Thus, the welfare loss can be written as:
ψ0(θ), zi(θ)− 0 · z0(θ) +
∑N
n=1 l
i
n · (1− τn) ·un(θ).
Denote eii(θ), { ∈  | w˜Coi (θ)> 0 & w˜Coi (θ)>maxj 6=i w˜Coj (θ)} as the set of performance ratio
 such that the i-th independent contract user set itself has the highest and positive approximate
C-MW (i.e., case [1]), ei
′
i (θ), {∈  | w˜Coi′ (θ)> 0 & w˜Coi′ (θ)>maxj 6=i′ w˜Coj (θ)} as the set of  such
that the i′-th (where i′ 6= i) independent contract user set has the highest and positive approximate
C-MW (i.e., case [2]), and e0i (θ) , { ∈  | w˜Coi (θ) < 0,∀i = 1, ..., Ic} as the set of  such that all
independent contract user sets have negative approximate C-MWs (i.e., case [3]).29 It is easy to
see that
⋃Ic
j=0 e
j
i equals , i.e., the whole range of . Here, the subscript and superscript in e
j
i (θ)
denote the indexes of allocated independent contract user sets under precise C-MWs and under
approximate C-MWs, respectively. For convenience, we will omit the parameter θ in eji (θ), as long
as there is no confusion caused.
Based on the above, the average welfare loss on every spectrum in Θi is formally given by∫
θ∈Θi
(∫
∈eii
ψi(θ) · f()d+
∫
∈e0i
ψ0(θ) · f()d+
∑
i′ 6=i
∫
∈ei′i
ψi′(θ) · f()d
)
· fΘ(θ)dθ
=
∫
θ∈Θi
(∫
∈ψi(θ)f()d+
∫
∈e0i
(
ψ0(θ)−ψi(θ)
)
f()d+
∑
i′ 6=i
∫
∈ei′i
(
ψi′(θ)−ψi(θ)
)
f()d
)
fΘ(θ)dθ
≤ ∫
θ∈Θi
(
(1− ¯i) · zi(θ)−
∫
∈e0i
Yi · f()d+
∑
i′ 6=i
∫
∈ei′i
(Yi′ −Yi) · f()d
)
· fΘ(θ)dθ
=
∫
θ∈Θi(1− ¯i) · zi(θ) · fΘ(θ)dθ−Yi ·β0i +
∑Ic
i′=1(Yi′ −Yi) ·βi
′
i ,
where
• ¯i =E[i],
∫
∈ if()d is the average performance ratio of the approximate MWIS algorithm
in calculating zi(θ), i.e., the expectation of random variable i;
• Yi =
∑N
n=1 l
i
n ·Xn is the sum of Xn of all contract users in the i-th independent set, where
Xn , P̂n−λ∗n is a constant associated with contract user n only;
• ∫
∈e0i
f()d is the probability of  ∈ e0i (θ), i.e., the probability of mis-allocating a spectrum
θ ∈Θi to the 0-th independent contract user set (or the spot market only) under w˜Coi (θ),∀i.
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• β0i =
∫
θ∈Θi
∫
∈e0i
f()fΘ(θ)ddθ is the average mis-allocation probability of spectrums intended
for the i-th independent contract user set to the 0-th one. That is, β0i is the average probability of
transferring spectrums from the i-th independent set to the 0-th one;
• ∫
∈ei′i
f()d is the probability of  ∈ ei′i (θ), i.e., the probability of mis-allocating a spectrum
θ ∈Θi to the i′-th independent set under approximate C-MWs w˜Coi (θ),∀i.
• βi′i =
∫
θ∈Θi
∫
∈ei′i
f()fΘ(θ)ddθ is the average mis-allocation probability of spectrum intended
for the i-th independent contract user set to the i′-th one. That is, βi
′
i is the average probability
of transferring spectrums from the i-th independent set to the i′-th one;
• The inequality follows because: (i) w˜Coi (θ) < 0 if  ∈ e0i , and w˜Coi (θ) < w˜Coi′ (θ) if  ∈ ei
′
i ; and
(ii) w˜
Co
i (θ) =ψ0(θ)−ψi(θ) +Yi. Thus, we have: ψ0(θ)−ψi(θ)<−Yi, and ψi′(θ)−ψi(θ)<Yi′ −Yi.
Thus, we can obtain an upper-bound of the expected welfare loss on every spectrum in Θi as
Loss(i) ≤Φi−Yi ·β0i +
∑Ic
i′=1(Yi′ −Yi) ·βi
′
i , (34)
where Φi ,
∫
θ∈Θi(1 − ¯i) · zi(θ)fΘ(θ)dθ is the average side welfare loss of the i-th independent
contract user set (over every spectrum in Θi).
7.2.2. Welfare Loss in Θ0 Using a similar analysis to that in (34), we can obtain an upper-
bound of the expected welfare loss on every spectrum in Θ0 as:
Loss(0) ≤Φ0 +
∑Ic
i=1 Yi ·βi0. (35)
where Φ0 ,
∫
θ∈Θ0(1− ¯0) · z0(θ)fΘ(θ)dθ is the average side welfare loss of the 0-th independent
contract user set (over every spectrum in Θ0), and β
i
0 =
∫
θ∈Θ0
∫
∈ei0
f()fΘ(θ)ddθ is the average
probability of transferring spectrums from the 0-th independent contract user set to the i-th one.
By (34) and (35), the average welfare loss on every spectrum is bounded by:∑Ic
i=0Loss
(i) ≤∑Ici=0 Φi +∑Ici=1 (∑Ici′=1(Yi′ −Yi) ·βi′i −Yi ·β0i )+∑Ici=1 Yi ·βi0
=
∑Ic
i=0 Φi +
∑Ic
i=1
(∑Ic
i′=1(Yi ·βii′ −Yi ·βi
′
i )−Yi ·β0i
)
+
∑Ic
i=1 Yi ·βi0
=
∑Ic
i=0 Φi−
∑Ic
i=1 Yi ·∆i ,
∑Ic
i=0 Φi−
∑N
n=1Xn · γn,
(36)
where
• ∆i ,
∑Ic
i′=1 β
i′
i + β
0
i −
∑Ic
i′=1 β
i
i′ − βi0 is the change on average allocation probability of a spec-
trum to the i-th independent contract user set, in which the first two terms denote the allocation
probability decrease (induced by mis-allocating the spectrums intended for the i-th independent
set to others), and the last two terms denote the allocation probability increase;
• γn ,
∑Ic
i=1 l
i
n ·∆i is the change on average allocation probability of a spectrum to contract user
n, which is the sum of the probability changes of all related independent sets;
• The second line follows because∑Ici=1∑Ici′=1 Yi′βi′i =∑Ici′=1∑Ici=1 Yiβii′ by exchanging the indices
of two summing operations, and the last line follows because Yi =
∑N
n=1 l
i
n ·Xn.
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7.2.3. Welfare Loss by Spectrum Under-Allocation It is important to note that the
welfare loss in (36) is induced by the non-optimal utilization of spectrum due to the mis-allocation,
without including the potential utility loss of contract users (defined in Eq. [8]) induced by the
spectrum under-allocation due to the mis-allocation.
Now we study the welfare loss of contract users induced by the spectrum under-allocation. From
(8) we can easily find that such a potential welfare loss is determined by the expected number of
spectrums that each contract user obtains. By Lemma 2, none of the contract users can obtain
spectrums more than his or her demand. Thus, any negative change on a contract user n’s average
allocation probability γn would impose certain welfare loss for contract user n, while any positive
change on γn may or may not bring welfare gain for contract user n (depending on whether
the contract user already obtained the demanded spectrums). Formally, the average welfare loss
induced by the spectrum under-allocation (over every spectrum) is bounded by:
Losswl ≤∑Nn=1 P̂n · [∑Ici=1 lin ·∆i]+ =∑Nn=1 P̂n · [γn]+. (37)
7.2.4. Overall Welfare Loss Combining (36) and (37), the expected overall welfare loss on
every spectrum is bounded by:
LossAll =
∑Ic
i=0Loss
(i) +Losswl
≤∑Ici=0 Φi−∑Nn=1Xn · γn +∑Nn=1 P̂n · [γn]+
=
∑Ic
i=0(1− ¯i) ·E[Zi]∗−
∑N
n=1Xn · γn +
∑N
n=1 P̂n · [γn]+ ,
(38)
where E[Zi]∗ ,
∫
θ∈Θi zi(θ)fΘ(θ)dθ. Since E[Zi]
∗ = 1
ρ·S ·E[W si ]∗, where E[W si ]∗ is the expected side
welfare of the i-th independent set over all S spectrums (defined in Eq. [22]) under the opti-
mal allocation, E[Zi]∗ represents the expected side welfare of the i-th independent set over every
spectrum.
7.2.5. Achievable Performance Ratio Let ¯,mini ¯i denote the minimum expected per-
formance ratio of all MWIS algorithms applied. Subtracting the overall welfare loss from the optimal
welfare (defined in Eq. [24]), we have the following average achievable welfare
WfAchi =WfOpt− ρS ·LossAll
=
∑Ic
i=0E[W si ]∗+
∑N
n=1(τnE[wcn]∗+ (1− τn)E[w˜cn]∗)− ρS ·LossAll
≥∑Ici=0 ¯ ·E[W si ]∗+∑Nn=1 (τnE[wcn]∗+ (1− τn)E[w˜cn]∗)+ ρS ·∑Nn=1 (Xnγn− P̂n [γn]+ ),
(39)
where ρS · LossAll is the overall welfare loss over all S spectrums, and WfOpt , E[W ]∗ =∑Ic
i=0E[W si ]∗+
∑N
n=1(τnE[wcn]∗+ (1− τn)E[w˜cn]∗) is the overall welfare (spectrum efficiency) under
the optimal allocation (using precise C-MWs), wherein (τnE[wcn]∗+ (1− τn)E[w˜cn]∗) is the expected
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welfare of the contract user n under the optimal allocation. Note that ρS ·γn is the negative change
of the expected number of spectrums allocated to contract user n.
Let us elaborate on the insights behind (39). First, there is a welfare loss ratio (1− ¯) on the
spot market (either the whole spot market, or the side spot market of a particular independent
contract user set), shown by the first term in (39). This welfare loss ratio is the same as the
performance loss ratio of the adopted approximate MWIS algorithm. Second, there is an average
welfare loss tn ,Xn · γn − P̂n · [γn]+ for each contract user n. Obviously, if γn > 0, which implies
that the number of spectrums for contract user n is decreased (under approximate C-MWs), we
have: tn =Xn · γn− P̂n · γn =−λ∗n · γn ≤ 0; and if γn < 0, which implies the number of spectrum for
contract user n is increased (under approximate C-MWs), we also have: tn =Xn · γn < 0.
Finally, we have the following bound for the relative welfare ratio (WR):
WR= Wf
Achi
WfOpt
≥ ¯+∑Nn=1 (1−¯)·(τnE[wcn]∗+(1−τn)E[w˜cn]∗)+ρS·tnE[W ]∗ . (40)
Note that the above discussion concerns the theoretical lower-bound of the achieved performance
ratio. Even if this bound is poor, the actual welfare may still be maintained at a good level. We
will show by our simulation results in Section 8.2 that even with the worst MWIS algorithm in
our simulations, the actual welfare ratio is more than 70%; whereas, the theoretical bound is lower
than  (i.e., 50%). Moreover, in Gao et al. (2012b), we will show that the above welfare ratio is
conservatively tight, in the sense that there does not exist another bound that is always better
than our proposed one in any case.
8. Simulation Results
We perform simulations in MATLAB. Unless otherwise stated, we will use the following default
setting: (i) all spot market SUs are randomly distributed in a square area with 1000m×1000m; (ii)
all contract SUs are placed on some predetermined locations in the square area; and (iii) all SUs’
valuations are uniformly distributed in [0,1], i.e., Fvm(x) = Fun(x) = x,∀x∈ [0,1]. Let IRs and IRc
denote the interference ranges of the spot market users and contract users, respectively.
8.1. Optimal Social Welfare E[W ]∗
Fig. 5 presents a realization of the random network topology with 20 randomly distributed spot
market users and 3 contract users located at (300m, 400m), (500m, 600m) and (700m, 400m),
respectively. The interference range of spot market users is IRs = 300m. The ellipses denote different
values of IRc, i.e., the interference range of contract users. Given a particular IRc, the spot market
users outside the ellipse(s) of a contract user (set) form the corresponding side market. The edges
between contract users denote their interference relationships under a certain IRc (e.g., when
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IRc=300m). In Fig. 5’s example, contract users 1 and 2 (or 2 and 3) interfere with each other,
while contract users 1 and 3 do not. Therefore, there are totally four independent contract user
sets: {1}, {2}, {3}, and {1, 3}.
Fig. 6 presents the expected social welfare vs IRc under different allocation strategies. Note
that each value in the figure is the average of 1,000 simulations, and each simulation corresponds
to a particular realization of the random network topology. The dashed straight line denotes the
maximum expected social welfare without the futures market (benchmark), which is achieved by
optimally allocating each spectrum to the spot market (i.e., to an MWIS of the spot market).
Obviously, this benchmark is independent of the interference range of contract users (IRc). The
upper dash curve (with mark “×”) denotes the maximum expected social welfare in a hypothet-
ical hybrid market, which consists of both the spot market and the futures market, but ignores
the potential utility loss of contract users (due to the spectrum under-allocation) in the futures
market. The red curve (with mark “©”) denotes the maximum expected social welfare under the
optimal allocation strategy in our proposed hybrid market. The lower three blue curves denote
the expected social welfares under allocation strategies “Contract-Last and Spot-Best” (with mark
“4”), “Contract-Random and Spot-Best” (with mark “”), and “Contract-Last and Spot-Best”
(with mark “5”), respectively. Under the “Contract-Last/Random/First and Spot-Best” strate-
gies, the SR allocates E[Dn] spectrums with the lowest, arbitrary, and highest utilities to each
contract user n, respectively. Here, E[Dn] is the expected number of spectrum contract user n
achieves under the optimal allocation (derived in our paper). The green curve (with mark “+”)
denotes the expected social welfare under such an allocation strategy that randomly allocates Dn
(i.e., the demand of contract user n) spectrums to each contract user n, called “Contract-Random
(Dn) and Spot-Best”. Note that under all of the above four strategies, when a spectrum is allocated
to a contract user (or a set of independent contract users) in the futures market, it will also be
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allocated to an MWIS of the associated side (spot) market at the same time. This is the reason
that we call them “Spot-Best”.
Fig. 6 shows that our proposed optimal allocation strategy outperforms other strategies signif-
icantly. The maximum expected social welfare under the proposed optimal strategy is on aver-
age 20% higher than that under “Contract-Random (Dn) and Spot-Best”. This performance gap
becomes even larger with more contract users. Moreover, the performances under “Contract-
First/Random/Last and Spot-Best” are very close to each other. This is because different SUs’
valuations for the same spectrum are independent of each other; hence, a spectrum that brings a
high or low valuation for a contract user may not bring high or low valuations for spot market
users. When IRc is small, the performance under “Contract-Last and Spot-Best” is a bit higher
than that under “Contract-Random and Spot-Best”, which is further a bit higher than that under
“Contract-First and Spot-Best”. This is because allocating a spectrum to a spot market user
can generate a higher effective welfare than allocating a spectrum (with the same valuation) to
a contract user (as the latter is discounted by τ). When IRc is large, the performances under
“Contract-First/Random/Last and Spot-Best” are identical, and all converge to the maximum
expected social welfare achieved in the proposed optimal allocation. This is because E[Dn]→ 0 in
this case; thus, all spectrums are optimally allocated to the spot market as in our proposed optimal
allocation. Notice that this maximum expected social welfare is less than the benchmark (without
the futures market), due to the utility loss of contract users in our hybrid market. Finally, the per-
formance under “Contract-Random (Dn) and Spot-Best” is same as that under “Contract-Random
and Spot-Best” when IRc is small; whereas, it is worse than that under “Contract-Random and
Spot-Best” when IRc is large. This reason is as follows. When IRc is small, E[Dn] =Dn (i.e., the
contract user demand is fully satisfied) due to the weak conflict between spot market users and
contract users); when IRc is large, E[Dn]→ 0 due to the severe conflict between spot market users
and contract users.
Fig. 6 further shows that the maximum expected social welfare with the futures market (under
the proposed optimal strategy) may be smaller than the maximum expected social welfare without
the futures market (benchmark), when, for example, IRc is large. That is, accepting contract users
in the futures market may reduce the total achieved social welfare, compared to that under a pure
spot market. Notice that this welfare gap can serve as a guidance used to decide whether or not
to accept futures contracts prior to the spectrum allocation optimization considered in this work.
For example, in this figure, it is more efficient to accept futures contracts when IRc is smaller
than 0.2, while it is more efficient in a pure spot market when Irc is larger than 0.2. The reason
that a hybrid market may be worse than a pure spot market is as follows. As long as a contract
is accepted, the SR has the responsibility to fulfill the contract; otherwise, the contract user will
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suffer certain utility loss, which harms the entire social welfare. In the benchmark case, however,
we consider the spot market only, while removing all contract users as well as their impacts on the
social welfare. That is, in this benchmark case, the SR will not allocate any spectrum to contract
users and there will be no penalty for this.
For a fair and more meaningful comparison, we propose the above hypothetical hybrid market
scenario in our simulation. Specifically, in the hypothetical scenario, there is no utility loss for
contract users when their demands are not satisfied. Clearly, the benchmark solution (ignoring
both the futures market and utility loss for contract users) is a feasible solution of operating such
a hypothetical scenario (considering the futures market but ignoring the utility loss for contract
users), but not a feasible solution of operating our proposed hybrid market (considering both the
futures market and utility loss for contract users). We can see that the maximum social welfare
in the hypothetical scenario is always higher than the maximum that can be achieved in the our
proposed hybrid market and the maximum that can be achieved in the benchmark case. More
specifically, when the IRc is small, the maximum social welfare in the hypothetical scenario is close
to that in our proposed hybrid market. This is because with a small IRc, the needs of contract users
are likely to be fulfilled in both the proposed and the hypothetical hybrid markets, hence leading
to a small difference between these two market scenarios. When the IRc is large, however, the
maximum social welfare in the hypothetical scenario is close to that in the benchmark case. This
is because with a large IRc, the needs of contract users are likely to be violated (i.e., assigned few
or even no spectrum by the SR) in both the proposed and the hypothetical hybrid markets, hence
leading to a large difference between these two market scenarios (due to the welfare loss in our
proposed scenarios), but a small difference between the hypothetical scenario and the benchmark
case (as in these two cases, spectrums are allocated to the spot market only, without any welfare
loss from contract users in the futures market).
8.2. Welfare Loss by Approximate MWIS Algorithms
Now we study the welfare loss and the relative welfare ratio (WR) under the approximate MWIS
algorithms. We take the performance ratio of the adopted approximate MWIS algorithm as a
random variable  drawn from [e0,1] uniformly and independently, where e0 ∈ [0,1]. Accordingly,
the average performance ratio is = 0.5 · (1 + e0).
Figs. 7 and 8 present the achieved WR and the analytical WR bound given in (40) under different
approximate MWIS algorithms (with different average performance ratio ). The upper (red) five
curves denote the achieved WR when IRc increases from 100m to 500m, and the lower (blue) five
curves denote the analytical WR bounds when IRc increases from 100m to 500m. From Figs. 7
and 8 we can see that WR decreases with IRc. This is because a larger IRc means a smaller
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Figure 8 The achieved WR and analytical WR bound
with IRs=300m.
side welfare zi(θ) for each independent contract user set Ici , and the side welfare z0(θ) becomes
relatively more significant. Thus, the C-MW w˙Coi (θ) defined in Definition 8 is mainly determined
by z0(θ), and the welfare loss is mainly due to the degradation of z0(θ). Additionally, with certain
degradation of z0(θ), the spectrum intended for the 0-th independent contract user set (i.e., the
spot market only) may be mis-allocated to another independent set (e.g., the i-th one) with a
welfare loss z0(θ)− i · zi(θ) +
∑N
n=1 l
i
n(1− τn)un(θ). Obviously, the smaller the side welfare zi(θ),
the higher the possible welfare loss. We can also see that the gap between the relative WR (either
the achieved WR or the analytical WR bound) under different values of IRc becomes smaller, when
IRs becomes larger. For example, when IRs=100m (in Fig. 7), the gap between the achieved WR
under IRc=100m and IRc=500m is 80%− 70% = 10% in the worst case (= 0.5); while when IRs
= 300m (in Fig. 8), this gap is only 78%− 72% = 6%. This is because a larger IRs implies a lower
level of zi(θ); thus, the impact of IRc on zi(θ) becomes less significant on the C-MWs.
Figs. 7 and 8 show that even with the worst approximate MWIS algorithm in our simulations
(i.e.,  = 0.5 when  drawn from [0,1]), the achieved social welfare can reach more than 70% of
the optimal social welfare. This implies that the optimal allocation (policy) proposed in this work
is robust to the performance degradation of the approximate MWIS algorithms. We will further
show in Gao et al. (2012b), that the above welfare ratio bound is conservatively tight, in the sense
that there does not exist another bound that is always better than our proposed one in any case.
9. Conclusion
We study the short-term secondary spectrum trading in a hybrid spectrum market, and focus on
the spectrum efficiency maximization with spatial spectrum reuse under stochastic and asymmetric
information. We first compute an off-line optimal policy that specifies the allocation of any spectrum
under every possible information realization, and then design an on-line VCG auction that elicits
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SUs’ private information and determines the real allocation of every spectrum. Such a solution
technique allows us to optimally allocate every spectrum in an on-line manner, based on the policy
derived and the information elicited. We further propose a heuristics solution based on a low
complexity VCG-like mechanism, and quantify the associated spectrum efficiency loss.
We would like to point out that the problem considered in this work (i.e., spectrum allocation in
an exogenous hybrid market in which every SU is associated and fixed in a particular market) can
be viewed as a sub-problem of the whole market optimization problem, which consists of both the
hybrid market formulation and the spectrum allocation. Our analysis of spectrum allocation in a
given market provides a very important first step towards the “social optimal design” for the whole
model. In our future work, we will study the problem of joint market formulation and spectrum
allocation, in which every SU can make strategic decisions about the market selection, and can
further negotiate with the SR for the contract details if choosing the futures market.
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10. Appendix
This file serves as the online technical report for the paper “Combining Spot and Futures Markets:
A Hybrid Market Approach to Dynamic Spectrum Access” by Lin Gao, Biying Shou, Ying-Ju Chen,
and Jianwei Huang, which is published in INFORMS Operations Research.
Outline of This Technical Report
• 10.1. Model Justification: Truthful Revelation of SU Demand Type
• 10.2. Model Justification: Impact of Expected Contract Demand
• 10.3. Model Justification: Problem of “Small Allocation”
• 10.4. Model Justification: Some Necessary Conditions for SIC
• 10.5. Model Extension: Optimal Solution with Hard Contracts
• 10.6. Performance Justification: Tightness of Welfare Ratio Bound
• 10.7. Proof for Proposition 1
• 10.8. Proof for Proposition 2
• 10.9. Proof for Lemma 1
• 10.10. Proof for Lemma 2
• 10.11. Proof for Corollary 1
• 10.12. Proof for Lemma 3
• 10.13. Proof for Lemma 4
• 10.14. Proof for Lemma 5
• 10.15. Proof for Lemma 6
10.1. Truthful Revelation of SU Demand Type
We first elaborate on an SU’s demand type (elastic or inelastic), which mainly depends on the
QoS requirement of the associated application/service. For example, applications, such as FTP
downloading, data backup, and cloud synchronization have elastic demand for spectrum, in the
sense that the tasks are not urgent in terms of time. Thus, the QoS will not be significantly
affected, even if the spectrum resource is limited and the transmission rate is low for a substantial
amount of time. On the other hand, applications, such as VoIP, video streaming, and real-time
data collection have inelastic demand for spectrum. In other words, they can only function well
when the data rate is guaranteed to be above certain thresholds such that the delay requirements
are met, otherwise they will suffer significant performance loss. It is important to note that the
information of application type is usually explicitly represented in the headers of data packets,
and can be easily extracted by the network operators through deep packet inspection. Hence, it is
reasonable to assume that SUs cannot fake their application types arbitrarily.
Gao, Shou, Chen, and Huang: A Hybrid Market Approach to Dynamic Spectrum Access
Operations Research 00(0), pp. 000–000, c© 0000 INFORMS 49
We further note that even if an SU has the capability of faking his or her application type, he or
she does not have the incentive to do so if the hybrid market is properly designed. Specifically, the
futures market insures SUs against uncertainties of future spectrum acquisition through pre-defined
contracts; whereas, the spot market allows SUs to compete for spectrum based on their real-time
demands and preferences. Therefore, with a proper design of the contracts in the futures market,
a rational SU with elastic demand will generally prefer spot transactions to achieve the flexible
resource-price tradeoff. In contrast, a rational SU with inelastic demand requiring minimum data
rates will prefer the certainty of contract in the futures market.
For example, consider an SU n with an inelastic demand Dn, a fixed total welfare Bn (when the
demand is satisfied), and a potential welfare loss scheme Jn (when the demand is not satisfied).
Suppose the SR offers the following contract: Ctrn = {B˜n,Dn,Jn}. Then the SU’s surplus when
choosing such a contract is:30
Sfn =Bn− B˜n.
On the other hand, when SU n chooses the spot market, the expected surplus is:
Ssn =Bn−Loss(Dn− d¯n)− d¯n · p¯n,
where d¯n is the average number of spectrum obtained through the spot market, and p¯n is the
average payment for every spectrum. As long as the welfare loss Loss(Dn− d¯n) is sufficiently large,
the SU will bid in such a way that the achieved demand d¯n equals the required demand Dn. Thus,
the expected surplus under such a bidding strategy in the spot market is:
Ssn =Bn−Dn · p¯n,
where p¯n is the average payment for every spectrum. By comparing the SU’s surpluses in both
market markets, we can easily find that if the payment specified in the contract is no larger than
the actual payment in the spot market (i.e., B˜n ≤Dn · p¯n), the SU can achieve a larger surplus
from the contract in the futures market. Note that such a contract design is also desirable by
a social-planning spectrum regulator, as truth-telling of SU is the prerequisite for the spectrum
utilization maximization.
Similarly, consider another example in which SU n has the elastic demand. When choosing the
spot market, he or she bids truthfully (under our proposed auction mechanism) and achieves an
expected surplus:
Ssn = d¯n · (w¯n− p¯n).
Here, d¯n is the average number of spectrum obtained through the spot market, p¯n is the average
payment for every spectrum, and w¯n is the average welfare achieved from every spectrum. Suppose
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that the SR offers the following contract Ctrn = {B˜n,Dn,Jn}, where Dn = d¯n. When choosing the
contract, the SU’s expected surplus is:
Sfn = d˜n · w˜n +Penalty(Dn, d˜n)− B˜n,
where d˜n ≤Dn is the average number of spectrum obtained through the contract, and p˜n is the
average welfare achieved from every spectrum. We further suppose that the penalty is defined in
the following way: Penalty(Dn, d˜n) = (Dn − d˜n) · B˜nDn , where B˜nDn is the average payment for every
spectrum. That is, the SR will pay back all of the unmet demand to the SU. Then, the SU’s
expected surplus when choosing the contract is:
Sfn = d˜n · w˜n− d˜n · B˜nDn .
Notice that d˜n ≤Dn = d¯n and w˜n ≤ w¯n (as the SU is more likely to obtain the high welfare spectrum
through the auction). Thus, if the average payment in the contract is no smaller than the average
payment in the spot market, i.e., B˜n
Dn
≥ p¯n, the SU can achieve a larger surplus from spot market.
From the above discussions, we show that through a proper design of contracts in the futures
market, we can prevent an SU with inelastic demand from choosing the spot market, and an SU
with elastic demand from choosing the futures market. Nevertheless, how to fully characterize the
future contract such that any SU will truthfully reveal his or her demand type and any other
required parameters (such as the demand/welfare loss of an SU with inelastic demand, or the
average number of spectrum achieved in the spot market for an SU with elastic demand) is a
challenging problem in general. Thus, to maintain analytical tractability, in this paper we focus on
the optimal spectrum allocation problem in an exogenously given hybrid market, in which all SUs
are assumed to truthfully reveal their demand types (market selections). In other words, the spot
market and the futures market are already given and fixed.
10.2. Impact of Expected Contract Demand
In our model, we assume that a contract user cares about the expected number of spectrum
(reflecting the expected data rate) that he or she will obtain, while not the strict number of
spectrum (reflecting the strict data rate). The key reason for this assumption is as follows.
The main practical motivation for such an assumption is that most wireless applications in
practice require an expected/average data rate during a certain time period, while only very few
applications is required to satisfy a strict data rate constraint at all times. For example, video
streaming concerns the average downloading rate in every minute, and VoIP concerns the average
downloading/uploading rate in every second. When the actual data rate is occasionally less than
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the average rate, various coding and error concealment technologies can be employed so that the
end-users will not feel significant performance degradation. Thus, with a proper choice of the length
of allocation period (e.g., 1 minute for video streaming, or 1 second for VoIP), such a contract
formulation (with the expected spectrum demand) is suitable for most wireless applications. In fact,
with the uncertainties of spectrum availability and SU utility for each spectrum, it is practically
impossible to guarantee a strict spectrum supply for each contract user. To our knowledge, no such
guarantee has been provided even in the latest communication standard.
To make our analysis more complete, we also provide the detailed theoretical evaluation for
the impact of this assumption on the achieved performance. That is, we evaluate the potential
welfare loss induced by this assumption, i.e., the gap between the maximum social welfare under
the expected contract demand and under the strict contract demand. The key idea and details
are given as follows. First, we denote We as the expected social welfare computed by the expected
contract demand, and A∗e as the optimal allocation that maximizes the expected social welfare We
(i.e., those studied in this paper). That is:
A∗e = arg max
A
We(A).
Similarly, we denote Ws as the strict social welfare computed by the strict contract demand, and
A∗s as the optimal allocation that maximizes the strict social welfare Ws. That is:
A∗s = arg max
A
Ws(A).
Then, using basic optimization principles, we have the following observation:
W ∗e ≥W ∗s ≥Ws(A∗e),
where W ∗e ,We(A∗e) is the maximum social welfare under the expected contract demand con-
straint, and W ∗s ,Ws(A∗s ) is the maximum strict social welfare under the strict contract demand
constraint. The first inequality follows because the expected contract demand constraint is looser
than the strict contract demand constraint; hence, the maximum social welfare W ∗s under the
strict contract demand constraint is upper-bounded by the maximum social welfare W ∗e under the
expected contract demand constraint. The second inequality follows because A∗s is the optimal
allocation that maximizes Ws; hence, W
∗
s =Ws(A
∗
s ) must be no smaller than W
∗
s (A
∗
e).
The above observation further implies that the gap between W ∗e and W
∗
s is bounded by the gap
between W ∗e and Ws(A
∗
e). That is:
W ∗e −W ∗s ≥W ∗e −Ws(A∗e).
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Figure 9 (a) The maximum expected social welfare W ∗e and the strict social welfare Ws(A
∗
e) under A
∗
e ; (b) The
ratio of Ws(A
∗
e) and W
∗
e .
The above formula implies that we can use the gap W ∗e and Ws(A
∗
e) to characterize an effective
upper-bound of the gap between W ∗e and W
∗
s . Note that it is difficult to compute the maximum
strict social welfare W ∗s directly; whereas, it is easy to compute the strict social welfare Ws(A
∗
e)
under the allocation A∗e. Thus, the above observation is useful for estimating the potential welfare
loss induced by the assumption of expected contract demand.
Finally, we provide numerical results to illustrate the gap of W ∗e and Ws(A
∗
e). Numerical results
in Fig. 9 show that the gap is lower than 3% when the scheduling period T is 100, and further
decreases with the increasing of the scheduling period T . Take the widely-used 3G LTE (FDD)
system as an example. The time length of each slot is 1 ms, and thus a scheduling period of T
(slots) corresponds to a total time length of T ms. Then, the above numerical results indicate that
the performance loss is no larger than 3% when scheduling spectrum every 100 ms, and is no larger
than 1% when scheduling spectrum every second (i.e., T = 1000). These results indicate that if the
spectrum regulator jointly schedules the spectrum in a relatively long time period (e.g., larger than
100 ms), the gap between the maximum expected social welfare and the maximum strict social
welfare is very small (e.g., smaller than 3%).
10.3. Problem of “Small Allocation”
It is important to note that our proposed analytical framework is available only when each con-
tract user requests a considerable number of spectrum in each period, such that the time average
approaches to the true expectation (of allocated spectrum). In a counter-example, if a user requests
a small allocation, say 1 channel for 1 period, he’ll either get it or not, hence the time average
won’t be the expectation. Next we discuss such a “small allocation” problem.
We would like to clarify that such a “small allocation” is unlikely to happen in a practical wireless
communication system. In fact, each contract user requires a considerable number of spectrum in
each period to support a desirable QoS. This is mainly due to two reasons. First, the length of each
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time slot in a wireless system is often quite small, e.g., in milliseconds or even in microseconds,
which corresponds to the typical length of frame in many wireless communication systems (such
as the 4G LTE networks and Wi-Fi networks). In fact, the physical limit of choosing the time
sloth length is the so called coherence time, which is the time within which the channel condition
does not change. In wireless communications, such coherence time is usually very small due to
fast small scale multi-path fading. Second, the time scale of each time period is relatively large,
e.g., in minutes or even hours, which corresponds to the validity period of contracts. Hence, the
number of slots in each time period (i.e., T ) is very large, e.g., T = 6 · 105 when the length of slot
is 1 millisecond and the length of period is 10 minutes. Due to the short time slot and long time
period, a contract user has to require a considerable number of spectrum in each time period to
achieve a certain data rate (so as to achieve the desirable QoS). For example, when the length of
slot is 1 millisecond, the length of period is 10 minutes (i.e., T = 6 ·105), and the average data rate
provided in each spectrum is 1Mbps, then a contract user with a data rate requirement of 264Kbps
(i.e., the typical data rate of the low resolution (320×240) video streaming service) requires a total
of 1.584 · 105 time slots in each time period.
10.4. Some Necessary Conditions for SIC
Before providing the problem formulation, we first present the formal definition for allocation
strategy and study the corresponding spatial interference constraints (SIC). An allocation strategy
specifies the allocation probability of any spectrum (to every SU) under any possible information
realization θ.31 More specifically,
Definition 9 (Allocation Strategy). An allocation strategy A(θ) is a mapping from every
information realization θ to a vector consisting of the allocation probability for every SU,32
A(θ), (as1(θ), ..., asM(θ);ac1(θ), ..., acN(θ)), ∀θ ∈Θ,
where asm(θ) ∈ [0,1] and acn(θ) ∈ [0,1] denote the allocation probabilities of a spectrum with infor-
mation θ to spot market user m and contract user n, respectively.
Now we study the necessary and sufficient conditions for a feasible allocation strategy A(θ),
referred to as the spatial interference constraints (SIC).
Since the SUs in the same clique can never use the same spectrum at the same time, we have
the following necessary conditions for a feasible A(θ):
∑
i∈Q ai(θ)≤ 1, ∀θ ∈Θ, ∀Q∈Q(G), (41)
where ai(θ) = a
c
i(θ) if SU i is a contract user, and ai(θ) = a
s
i(θ) if SU i is a spot market user.
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Unfortunately, the conditions in (41) are not sufficient for satisfying the spatial interfer-
ence constraints. This can be illustrated by a simple graph G(a) with 5 SUs forming a ring,
as shown in Figure 10 (a). We can easily see that the set of all cliques in graph G(a) is
Q(G(a)) = {{1},{2},{3},{4},{5},{1,2},{2,3},{3,4},{4,5},{5,1}}. Consider an allocation strategy
with ak(θ) = 0.5,∀k = 1, ...,5. It satisfies the conditions in (41). But there is no feasible schedule
to achieve this allocation, that is, it is not a feasible allocation. The same problem arises in any
graph with odd holes, i.e., a loop formed by an odd number of edges without a chord in between.
This suggests that in addition to the conditions in (41), we need to add additional constraints
corresponding to the odd holes. Specifically, referring to West (2001), the constraint corresponding
to an odd hole with K vertices is: ∑K
k=1 ak(θ)≤ K−12 , ∀θ ∈Θ. (42)
Due to space limitations, we do not present the detailed proof here. Recall the example in Figure
10 (a), an allocation strategy with ak(θ) = 0.4,∀k= 1, ...,5 is feasible since
∑K
k=1 ak(θ)≤ 2, and we
can achieve such an allocation by the following schedule: scheduling/assigning the spectrums (with
information θ) to the user sets {1,3}, {1,4}, {2,4}, {2,5} and {3,5} with equal fraction (probability),
i.e., 20%. Obviously, each user achieves an allocation probability of 40%.
The worse thing is that even if we consider the constraints in (42) imposed by the odd holes in
addition to those in (41) imposed by the cliques, we are not guaranteed to have a feasible allocation.
This can be further illustrated by the example shown in Figure 10 (b). We can see that there are 3
types of cliques in the graph G(b): the cliques formed by each SU (e.g., {1}), the cliques formed by
the adjacent pairs of SUs (e.g., {1,2}), and the cliques formed by the 3 SUs in the same triangles
(e.g., {1,2,6}). We can also see there are five 3-SUs odd holes each corresponding to one triangle
and one 5-SUs odd hole {1,2,3,4,5}. Consider an allocation strategy with ak(θ) = 13 ,∀k = 1, ...,6.
Obviously, it satisfies the conditions in (41) and (42). But there is no feasible schedule to achieve
this allocation.
10.5. Optimal Solution with Hard Contracts
Similar to Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 in Section 5.2, we have the following necessary condition for
hard contracts.
Corollary 1 (Necessary Condition). For any contract user n with the hard contract, we have:
E[dn] = 0 or Dn.
Corollary 1 states that a hard contract user either gets spectrums (on average) equals to his demand,
or nothing. The reason is that once a hard contract is violated, the welfare loss is a constant B̂n
regardless of the actual number of spectrums the contract user n obtains.
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Figure 10 An illustration of graphs with odd holes.
According to Corollary 1, a hard contract is either fully satisfied, i.e., E[dn] = Dn, or fully
violated, i.e., E[dn] = 0. Thus, for a future market with N hard contracts, there are 2N possible
outcomes based on the state (satisfied or violated) of each contract. Each outcome corresponds to
a potential best solution, and the global optimal solution is the one that achieves the highest profit
within the 2N potential best solutions.
Consider a particular outcome where a subset of hard contracts N+ are satisfied and others are
violated, i.e., E[dn] =Dn,∀n ∈ N+ and E[dn] = 0,∀n /∈ N+. Obviously, we have an(θ)≡ 0,∀θ ∈Θ
for all contract users n /∈ N+, and thus we can ignore these contracts directly. For the reduced
market (by removing those contract users not in N+), the PO’s objective function in (26) can be
rewritten as follows:
A∗0(θ) = arg maxA0(θ)
(
F +S ·∑Kk=1 ∫θHk(θ)ak(θ)fΘ(θ)dθ) ,
s.t. (i) ak(θ)≥ 0, ∀k= 1, ...,K,∀θ ∈Θ;
(ii)
∑K
k=1 ak(θ)≤ 1, ∀θ ∈Θ;
(iii) E[dn] =Dn, ∀n∈N+;
(43)
Note that the notations in (43) are defined in a same way as those in (26).
Compare the objective function (43) for hard contracts to (26) for soft contracts, we can find
that both objective functions have the same structure except for the third constraint. Specifically,
in (26) the third constraint is an inequality constraint, while in (43) the third constraint is an
equality constraint. To solve (43), we similarly introduce Lagrange multipliers µk(θ) for constraint
(i), η(θ) for constraint (ii) and λn for constraint (iii). The dual constraints for µn(θ) and η(θ) are
same as those for (26), while the dual constraint for λn becomes:
(D.3) Dn =E[dn], and λ∗n ·
(
Dn−E[dn]
)
= 0, ∀n∈N+.
By the Euler-Lagrange conditions for optimality and duality principle, we can derive the best
solution for (43) in a similar way to compute the optimal solution for (26). Specifically, the feasible
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ranges of µ∗k(θ) and η
∗(θ) are totally same as those for soft contracts given by Lemmas 3 and 4.
By the dual constraint for λn mentioned above, the optimal λ
∗
n is a bit different to that for soft
contracts given by Lemma 6:
λ∗n =
(
argλn S
∫
θ∈Θ+n (Λ∗−n,λn)
fΘ(θ)dθ=Dn
)
, ∀n∈N .
That is, for hard contracts, we do not need to restrict the shadow price λn to be non-negative.
Given the optimal shadow prices, the optimal solution can be characterized by Lemma 5.
10.6. Tightness of Welfare Ratio Bound
In this section, we analyze the tightness of our proposed welfare ratio bound. We first explain what
factors affect the tightness of the welfare ratio (WR). We provide three examples to show when the
bounds can be conservatively tight. We then explain why an approximate algorithm and the WR
analysis are important in this problem, although the optimal policy can be solved off-line.
We first show that the tightness of the welfare ratio (WR) in Eq. (40) depends on the performance
of the adopted approximate MWIS algorithm. This is illustrated by our simulation results in Figs. 7
and 8, which show that WR is tighter with better approximate MWIS algorithms (i.e., those
with higher ¯), and looser with worse approximate MWIS algorithms (i.e., those with lower ¯). In
particular, when the adopted approximate MWIS algorithm achieves a similar performance to the
optimal MWIS algorithm (i.e., ¯ is close to 1), we have WR→ 1, which implies that the welfare
ratio bound is tight in this case.
We further show that the tightness of WR also depends on the market structure. For example,
we have WR→ ¯, if ∑Mm=1 E(wsm)∗ >>∑Nn=1 (τnE(wcn)∗+(1− τn)E(w˜cn)∗), i.e., the potential welfare
from the spot market is much larger than that from the futures market under the optimal allocation.
This implies that the proposed welfare ratio bound is tight, since ¯ is the performance bound
of the adopted approximate MWIS algorithms. On the other hand, we have tn→ 0 and WR→
¯+ (1− ¯) = 1, if ∑Mm=1 E(wsm)∗ <<∑Nn=1 (τnE(wcn)∗ + (1− τn)E(w˜cn)∗), i.e., the potential welfare
from the futures market is much larger than that from the spot market.33 This also implies that
the proposed welfare ratio bound is tight.
In the above discussion, we have already provided three illustrative examples in which the pro-
posed welfare ratio bounds are tight. In the first example, we use a close-to-optimal approximate
MWIS algorithm, and achieve a WR close to 1. In the second example, we consider a market sce-
nario with a neglectable futures market, and achieve a WR close to ¯, where ¯ is the performance
bound of the adopted approximate MWIS algorithms. In the last example, we consider a market
scenario with a neglectable spot market, and achieve a WR close to 1. Based on the above discus-
sion, we conclude that our proposed bound is conservatively tight, in the sense that there does not
exist another bound that is always better than our proposed one.
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Now we explain why an approximate algorithm and the WR analysis is important in this prob-
lem. The optimal policy that maximizes the expected spectrum efficiency (in Theorem 1) can be
derived in an off-line manner based on the stochastic network information. This indeed is one
of the main contributions of this paper. However, the actual allocation of each spectrum in each
time slot depends not only on the pre-derived optimal policy, but also on the real-time network
information realization. Thus, it must be determined in an on-line manner. With spatial spectrum
reuse, however, determining the optimal allocation of each spectrum (in each time slot) via a VCG
auction involves solving NP-hard problems (i.e., the MWIS problems). Hence, the corresponding
optimal allocation cannot be easily determined in an on-line manner due to the high complexity of
solving NP-hard problems. This is the major reason why we introduce the approximate algorithms
for the real-time spectrum allocation in each time slot.
10.7. Proof for Proposition 1
A feasible allocation must be achievable in practice by a feasible schedule. A schedule essentially
specifies the fraction of spectrums (with certain information θ) to a particular set of indepen-
dent SUs. Define the fraction of spectrums to a particular independent SUs set as the allocation
probability to this independent set.
A feasible schedule implies that the total fraction of spectrums (with information θ) to all
independent SU sets does not exceed 100%, which is exactly equivalent to the condition in (13).
That is, for any feasible allocation or schedule, there is always an allocation strategy A(θ) (with
respect to the independent SU set) satisfying (13) and achieving the same allocation.
10.8. Proof for Proposition 2
W e prove the proposition by contradiction. Suppose aInd∗k (θ)> 0 for certain independent set
Ik = I
c
k
⋃
Isk, where I
s
k is not an MWIS of the side marketG
s
Ic
k
. Then the PO can improve his expected
profit by transferring the spectrums for independent set Ik = I
c
k
⋃
Isk to another independent set
{Ick, Is∗k }, where Is∗k is indeed an MWIS of the side market GsIc
k
. The reason is that the PO can
achieve a higher revenue from the spot market user Is∗k than that from set I
s
k, while the revenue
from the contract user set Ick does not change (since the allocation to contract users remains the
same). It follows that the aInd∗k (θ) must be zero.
10.9. Proof for Lemma 1
W e prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose there exists any θ such that
∑K
k=0 a
∗
k(θ)< 1.
Obviously, by increasing a∗0(θ) to a
+
0 (θ) = 1−
∑K
k=1 a
∗
k(θ), the PO can improve the expected revenue
E[Z0] from the spot market (which is given in (22)) without affecting the revenue and cost from
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the contract users. This implies the PO can achieve a higher expected profit with a new strategy
A+(θ) =
(
a+0 (θ), a
∗
1(θ), ..., a
∗
K(θ)
)
.
10.10. Proof for Lemma 2
W e prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose there exists a contract user n with E[dn] =
S ·∫
θ
an(θ) ·fΘ(θ)dθ >Dn, where an(θ) =
∑K
k=0 l
n
k ·ak(θ). Let Kn denote the set of independent sets
containing contract user n, i.e., lnk = 1,∀k ∈Kn. Let Kn/{n} denote the set of independent sets each
corresponding to one element in Kn by removing contract user n.34
Let A+(θ) =
(
a+0 (θ), a
+
1 (θ), ..., a
+
K(θ)
)
denote a new allocation strategy, by transferring certain
spectrum for each independent set in Kn to the corresponding set in Kn/{n}, i.e., (i) a+k (θ) =
a∗k(θ)− σ,∀k ∈Kn, and a+k (θ) = a∗k(θ) + σ,∀k ∈Kn/{n}, and (ii) a+k (θ) = a∗k(θ),∀k /∈Kn
⋃Kn/{n}. It
is easy to see that with A+(θ), the allocation probability to contract user n decreases to a+n (θ) =
an(θ) − σ · |Kn|, and thus the expected number of spectrums for contract user n decreases to
E[d+n ] = E[dn]− σ · S · |Kn|. As long as 0< σ ≤ E[dn]−DnS·|Kn| , we have E[d+n ] = E[dn]− σ · S · |Kn| ≥Dn,
i.e., the contract n is still fulfilled. This implies that the PO suffers no short-term revenue loss from
contract user n. Besides, the allocation probabilities to all other contract users remain the same,
and thus the PO suffers no short-term revenue loss from other contract users. On the other hand,
the PO can achieve a higher expected side revenue from the side markets of the independent sets
in Kn/{n} than those in Kn. It follows that the PO can achieve higher expected profit with new
strategy A+(θ).
10.11. Proof for Corollary 1
B y Lemma 2, we have E[dn] ≤ Dn,∀n ∈ N . Thus, we only need to show that there is no
contract user n with 0<E[dn]<Dn. We prove the corollary by contradiction. Suppose there exists
a contract user n with 0<E[dn]<Dn. According to the definitions of hard contract, the expected
revenue achieved from contract user n is E[Rn] =Bn− B̂n. Let us define Kn and Kn/{n} in a same
way as those in Appendix-10.10.
Let A+(θ) =
(
a+0 (θ), a
+
1 (θ), ..., a
+
K(θ)
)
denote a new allocation strategy, by transferring all spec-
trums for each independent set in Kn to the corresponding set in Kn/{n}, i.e., (i) a+k (θ) = 0,∀k ∈Kn,
and a+k (θ) = a
∗
k(θ) + a
∗
k′(θ),∀k ∈Kn/{n}, where k′ is the corresponding independent set in Kn, and
(ii) a+k (θ) = a
∗
k(θ),∀k /∈Kn
⋃Kn/{n}. It is easy to see that with A+(θ), the allocation probability to
contract user n decreases to a+n (θ) = 0, while the probabilities to all other contract users remain the
same. Obviously, the PO achieves the same expected revenue from all contract users. On the other
hand, the PO can achieve a higher expected side revenue from the side markets of the independent
sets in Kn/{n} than those in Kn. Thus, the PO can achieve higher expected profit with new strategy
A+(θ).
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10.12. Proof for Lemma 3
W e prove the lemma by duality principle in particular the dual constraint (D.1), i.e., µ∗k(θ)≥ 0,
a∗k(θ) ≥ 0 and µ∗k(θ) · a∗k(θ) = 0,∀k ∈ K, θ ∈ Θ. According to the Definitions 6 and 7, we have:
L(k)(θ) =J (k)1 (θ) +µ∗k(θ),∀k.
Proof for Condition (a). Suppose µ∗k(θ)> 0 by contradiction. Then we have: L(k)(θ) =J (k)1 (θ) +
µ∗k(θ)> 0, which implies a
∗
k(θ) = 1 by the Euler-Lagrange conditions for optimality or (28). Obvi-
ously, this violates the constraint µ∗n(θ) · a∗n(θ) = 0.
Proof for Condition (b). Suppose µ∗k(θ)> |J (k)1 (θ)|> 0 by contradiction. Then we have: L(k)(θ) =
J (k)1 (θ)+µ∗k(θ)> 0, which implies a∗k(θ) = 1. Obviously, this violates the constraint µ∗k(θ) ·a∗k(θ) = 0.
Thus, we have: µ∗k(θ)∈ [0, |J (k)1 (θ)|], since µ∗k(θ)≥ 0.
10.13. Proof for Lemma 4
W e prove the lemma by duality principle in particular the dual constraint (D.2), i.e., η∗(θ)≥ 0,∑K
k=1 a
∗
k(θ)≤ 1 and η∗(θ) ·
(
1−∑Kk=1 a∗k(θ))= 0,∀θ ∈Θ. According to the Definitions 7 and 8, we
have: J (k)1 (θ) =J (k)2 (θ)− η∗(θ), ∀k.
Proof for Condition (a). We first prove that η∗(θ)≤K1(θ),maxk∈KJ (k)2 (θ). Suppose η∗(θ)>
K1(θ) by contradiction. Then we have: J (k)1 (θ) =J (k)2 (θ)− η∗(θ)< 0,∀k. Together with Lemma 3,
we further have: L(k)(θ)< 0,∀k, and thus a∗k(θ) = 0,∀k, which implies
∑K
k=1 a
∗
k(θ) = 0. Obviously,
this violates the constraint η∗(θ) · (1−∑Kk=1 a∗k(θ)) = 0.
We then prove that η∗(θ) ≥max(0,K2(θ)). The result is obvious if K2(θ) ≤ 0 since η∗(θ) ≥ 0.
Thus, we focus on the case of K2(θ) > 0, where there exist at least two independent sets with
positive core marginal profit J (k)2 (θ). Let k1 and k2 denote the independent sets with the highest
and second-highest core marginal profits, respectively. That is, J (k1)2 (θ) =K1(θ)> 0 and J (k2)2 (θ) =
K2(θ)> 0. Suppose η
∗(θ)<K2(θ) by contradiction. Then there exist at least two independent sets,
i.e., k1 and k2, with positive mental marginal profit, i.e., J (k1)1 (θ)> 0 and J (k2)1 (θ)> 0. Together
with Lemma 3, we further have: L(k1)(θ)> 0 and L(k2)(θ)> 0, and thus a∗k1(θ) = 1 and a∗k2(θ) = 1,
which implies
∑K
k=1 a
∗
k(θ)> 1. This obviously violates the constraint
∑K
k=1 a
∗
k(θ)≤ 1.
Proof for Condition (b). Suppose η∗(θ)> 0 by contradiction. Then we have: J (k)1 (θ) =J (k)2 (θ)−
η∗(θ) < 0,∀k. Together with Lemma 3, we further have: L(k)(θ) < 0,∀k, and thus a∗k(θ) = 0,∀k,
which implies
∑K
k=1 a
∗
k(θ) = 0. Obviously, this violates the constraint η
∗(θ) · (1−∑Kk=1 a∗k(θ)) = 0.
10.14. Proof for Lemma 5
W e prove the lemma by the Euler-Lagrange conditions for optimality, i.e., (28).
We first prove a∗k(θ) = 0 for all independent sets k /∈ k∗. By contradiction, we suppose there
exists an independent set k0 /∈ k∗ with a∗k0(θ) > 0. According to (28), we have: L(k0)(θ) ≥ 0. By
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Lemmas 3 and 4, we further have: J (k0)2 (θ) ≥ 0. Further, according to the definition of k∗, we
have: J (k0)2 (θ) < K1(θ), since k0 /∈ k∗. This implies J (k)2 (θ) = K1(θ) > 0,∀k ∈ k∗. By Lemmas 3
and 4, we further have: L(k)(θ)> 0, and thus a∗k(θ) = 1,∀k ∈ k∗, which implies that
∑K
k=1 a
∗
k(θ) =
a∗k0(θ)+
∑
k∈k∗ a
∗
k(θ)+
∑
k/∈k∗∪{k0} a
∗
k(θ)> 1. This obviously violates the constraint
∑K
k=1 a
∗
k(θ)≤ 1.
We then prove the optimal solution for k ∈ k∗. Obviously, J (k)2 (θ) =K1(θ),∀k ∈ k∗.
Proof for case (a). By Lemma 4, we have: η∗(θ)≤K1(θ) if K1(θ)> 0, which implies J (k)1 (θ) =
J (k)2 (θ)−η∗(θ) =K1(θ)−η∗(θ)≥ 0, ∀k ∈ k∗. By Lemma 3, we further have: µ∗k(θ) = 0 if J (k)1 (θ)≥ 0,
which further implies L(k)(θ) =J (k)1 (θ)− 0≥ 0, ∀k ∈ k∗.
Case (a.1). Suppose η∗(θ) = K1(θ) > 0. By constraint η∗(θ) · (1 −
∑K
k=1 a
∗
k(θ)) = 0, we have:∑K
k=1 a
∗
k(θ) = 1, which implies
∑
k∈k∗ a
∗
k(θ) = 1, since a
∗
k(θ) = 0, ∀k /∈ k∗.
Case (a.2). Suppose η∗(θ) <K1(θ). Then we must have: K2(θ) <K1(θ), otherwise η∗(θ) must
equal to K1(θ) since η
∗(θ)∈ [max(0,K2(θ)),K1(θ)]. This implies that there is only one independent
set, denoted by k1, in the set k
∗. Obviously, L(k1)(θ) = K1(θ)− η∗(θ) > 0. According to (28), we
have: a∗k1(θ) = 1, which implies
∑
k∈k∗ a
∗
k(θ) = 1, since k
∗ = {k1}.
Proof for case (b). By Lemma 4, we have: η∗(θ) = 0 if K1(θ) = 0, which implies J (k)1 (θ) =
J (k)2 (θ)− 0 = K1(θ) = 0, ∀k ∈ k∗. By Lemma 3, we further have: µ∗k(θ) = 0 if J (k)1 (θ) = 0, which
further implies L(k)(θ) =J (k)1 (θ)−0 = 0, ∀k ∈ k∗. According to the dual constraint (D.2), we have:∑
k∈k∗ a
∗
k(θ)≤ 1.
Proof for case (c). By Lemma 4, we have: η∗(θ) = 0 if K1(θ) < 0, which implies J (k)1 (θ) =
J (k)2 (θ)− 0 =K1(θ)< 0, ∀k ∈ k∗. By Lemma 3, we further have: µ∗k(θ)≤ |J (k)1 (θ)| if J (k)1 (θ)< 0,
which further implies L(k)(θ) =J (k)1 (θ) +µ∗k(θ) =K1(θ) +µ∗k(θ)≤ 0, ∀k ∈ k∗.
Case (c.1). Suppose µ∗k(θ) = |J (k)1 (θ)| > 0. By constraint µ∗k(θ) · a∗k(θ) = 0, we have: a∗k(θ) = 0,
∀k ∈ k∗.
Case (c.2). Suppose µ∗k(θ)< |J (k)1 (θ)|. Then we have: L(k)(θ)< 0, ∀k ∈ k∗. According to (28), we
have: a∗k(θ) = 0, ∀k ∈ k∗.
10.15. Proof for Lemma 6
W e first note that E[dn], S
∫
θ∈Θ+n (Λ∗) fΘ(θ)dθ decreases with the contract user n’s own shadow
price λn, while increases with other contract users’ shadow prices λn′ ,∀n′ 6= n. For convenience, we
write E[dn] as a function of λn, denoted by E[dn(λn)].35 Let λon denote the shadow price λn such
that E[dn(λn)] =Dn, i.e., λon , argλn(E[dn(λn)] =Dn). Thus, we can rewrite the optimal shadow
price λ∗n in Lemma 6 as λ
∗
n = max
{
0, λon},∀n. We prove the lemma by duality principle in particular
the dual constraint (D.3), i.e., λ∗n ≥ 0, Dn−E[dn(λ∗n)]≥ 0 and λ∗n ·
(
Dn−E[dn(λ∗n)]
)
= 0, ∀n∈N .
Consider the first case: E[dn(0)]≤Dn. It is easy to see that λon < 0, since E[dn(λn)] decreases with
λn. Thus, we only need to prove λ
∗
n = max
{
0, λon
}
= 0. Suppose λ∗n > 0 by contradiction. Then we
have: E[dn(λ∗n)]<E[dn(0)]≤Dn. This obviously violates the constraint λ∗n ·
(
Dn−E[dn(λ∗n)]
)
= 0.
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Consider the second case: E[dn(0)] > Dn. It is easy to see that λon > 0. Thus, we only need
to prove λ∗n =
{
0, λon
}
= λon > 0. Suppose λ
∗
n > λ
o
n by contradiction. Then we have: E[dn(λ∗n)] <
E[dn(λon)] =Dn. This obviously violates the constraint λ∗n ·
(
Dn−E[dn(λ∗n)]
)
= 0. Suppose λ∗n <λ
o
n
by contradiction. Then we have: E[dn(λ∗n)]>E[dn(λon)] =Dn. This obviously violates the constraint
E[dn(λ∗n)]≤Dn.
